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Edward Snowden is a hero. In 2013, he leaked what can arguably be considered as 
the greatest quantity of classified and top-secret foreign intelligence in history. The 
leak revealed the extent of pervasive global government surveillance that has been 
and continues to be conducted by foreign intelligence agencies such as the National 
Security Agency (NSA) in the United States and the Government Communications 
Headquarters (GCHQ) in the United Kingdom. His actions have led to international 
security sector reform of the international regulation of foreign intelligence liaison.  
Citizen Four, the 2015 Oscar award-winning documentary, is the story of 
Snowden. When asked by Glen Greenwald and Laura Poitras, the journalist and 
documentarian who covered his journey, why he did what he did, Snowden’s 
response was that: 
 
‘[I]t all comes down to state power against the people’s ability to meaningfully 
oppose that power ... if the policy switches that are the only thing that restrain these 
states were changed, you couldn’t meaningfully oppose these … that hardened me 
into action.’1  
 
When closing a TED talk on how we take back the internet, Snowden’s idea worth 
sharing was that: 
 
‘… [D]emocracy may die behind closed doors but we as individuals are born behind 
those same closed doors … We don’t have to give up our privacy to have good 
government … We don’t have to give up our liberty to have security … By working 
together, we can have both open government and private lives ….’2 
 
The relationship between state power and people’s opposition, the individual and 
democracy, privacy and good government, liberty and security are themes that run 
throughout this dissertation. They are thematic relationships that underlie the 
importance of the international regulation of foreign intelligence liaison. The 
international regulation of foreign intelligence liaison will continue to be shaped by 
these relationships. 
 Chapter I picks up on these themes by reviewing the international regulation 
of foreign intelligence liaison as a phenomenon. Part II defines foreign intelligence, 
                                                
1 L Poitras. Citizen Four, Documentary (2014 Radius TWC). 
2 E Snowden. ‘Edward Snowden: Here’s how we take back the Internet’ Ted Talk 2014, available 
athttp://www.ted.com/talks/edward_snowden_here_s_how_we_take_back_the_internet?language=en#





part III sets up the objectives of a regime for international law in liberal democracies, 
part IV recognises the challenges to effective oversight of foreign intelligence 
agencies and part V maps out different reasons for and uses and forms of foreign 
intelligence liaison. A core argument is that the inevitable abuse and misuse of 
foreign intelligence liaison should be regulated through a horizontal accountability 
mechanism as an international best practice.  
 Chapter II focuses on the international regulation of foreign intelligence 
liaison through a legal analysis. It draws on the themes by summarising (part II) and 
critiquing (part III) two landmark judgments having the potential to set an 
international best-practice precedent that contributes to the international regulation of 
foreign intelligence liaison. The core argument is that communications interception 
warrants should be regulated by judicial pre-authorisation. This is a practical 
application of Chapter I’s core theoretical argument mentioned above. 
 Chapter III develops these themes by analysing the international regulation of 
foreign intelligence liaison through recommendations. Part II explores the regulation 
of signals intelligence (SIGINT) in South Africa. Part III sets out the national and 
regional applications of art 17 of the ICCPR with regard to private communications. 
Finally, by summarising and applying the core arguments of Chapters I and II to 
Chapter III, part IV recommends legal reform through a General Intelligence Laws 

















CHAPTER I: INTERNATIONAL REGULATION OF FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE 




This chapter reviews the international regulation of foreign intelligence liaison. It 
initially maps out a suggested definition of foreign intelligence liaison, sets out the 
objectives of a regime for international law in liberal democracies and recognises the 
challenges to effective oversight of foreign intelligence agencies. International co-
operation of foreign intelligence agencies, the globalisation of foreign intelligence 
liaison and intra-alliance foreign intelligence liaison are then explored. An analysis is 
subsequently advanced of the utility of international intelligence co-operation; this 
includes a comparison of different forms of foreign intelligence liaison and methods 
of managing bilateral intelligence liaison. The analysis is rounded off with an 
example of foreign intelligence liaison via rendition.  
 Finally, the costs and benefits of foreign intelligence liaison are assessed and 
recommendations are made as to how mistrust over foreign intelligence liaison can 
be overcome. 
 
II DEFINING FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE 
 
Intelligence is  
 
‘a specialised subset of information that meets the stated or understood needs of 
policy makers and has been collected, analysed and disseminated to support a state’s 
decision and policy makers.’3  
 
In the context of foreign intelligence reform, intelligence is ‘the production of 
unbiased information about (external) threats to the national vision’.4 Foreign 
intelligence is required by states as some states or international actors hide 
information harmful to another state’s national security from other states or 
international actors. States attempt to gather this information either secretly or 
covertly.  
                                                
3 G Hannah, KA O’Brien & A Rathmell. ‘Intelligence and Security Legislation for Security Sector 
Reform’ Technical Report for the United Kingdom’s Security Sector Development Advisory Team 






Whether as a process, an organisation or a product, intelligence can take on 
the form of:  
• national 
•  strategic 
• tactical 
• foreign and security intelligence 
• counterintelligence 
• counterespionage 
• assessment, or  
• covert action intelligence.  
 
The immediate or long-term foreign intelligence product delivered to customers to 
support decisions on foreign targets and external threats is driven by the need to 
know the intentions, capabilities and activities of other states. Foreign intelligence 
organisations, functionally structured to undertake the intelligence process of 
collecting, processing, analysing and disseminating intelligence relevant to external 
security, need to forecast threats, risks, events and outcomes. An analysis of foreign 
intelligence is primarily focused on the human intelligence (HUMINT) and signals 
intelligence (SIGINT) means of collection. This dissertation focuses primarily on the 
international regulation of foreign SIGINT liaison.  
The South African National Communications Centre (NCC) Bill defined 
foreign SIGINT as: 
 
‘… intelligence derived from the interception of electromagnetic, acoustic and other 
signals, including the equipment that produces such signals, and includes any 
communication that emanates from outside the borders of the Republic, or passes 
through or ends in the Republic.’5 
 
The pre-emption and prevention of forecast attacks by terrorist cells and rogue states 
would not be possible without improving effective HUMINT and SIGINT 
intelligence collection.6  
In liberal democracies, foreign intelligence requires a clear mandate, central 
co-ordination, oversight and accountability, and independent judicial and 
                                                
5 National Strategic Intelligence Amendment Bill [B 38-2008]. 





parliamentary oversight and accountability. This is because – notably in the United 
Kingdom and the United States – the separation of powers principle is a founding 
principle of such liberal democracies. While control ‘set(s) out the constraints under 
which a (foreign) intelligence agencies operate’,7 accountability ‘is an information 
process whereby (foreign) agencies are under a legal obligation to answer truly and 
completely the questions put to it by an authority to which it is accountable’.8 
However, only some states have written legislation that regulates their foreign 
intelligence agencies. Though central co-ordination and independent parliamentary 
oversight and accountability are more applicable to security intelligence agency 
reform, foreign intelligence agencies can be pressured to be regulated by legislative 
oversight through international courts such as the European Court of Human Rights, 
or have reform pressure exerted on them by donor organisations such as the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) or the World Bank (WB).9 
 
III OBJECTIVES OF A REGIME FOR INTERNATIONAL LAW IN LIBERAL 
DEMOCRACIES 
 
Foreign intelligence agencies are crucial to the safeguarding of the state, its people 
and its institutions. However, the nature of their work can infringe the founding 
values of liberal democracies. An example of a founding value would be the rule of 
law. While a delicate balance exists between neither compromising national security 
nor undermining democratic principles, states should theoretically create a 
‘democratic control, oversight and review’10 regime of the work of foreign 
intelligence agencies.  
Though the primary purpose of this regime should be to enhance the 
legitimacy of the activities of a state’s foreign intelligence agency, the objectives of 
this regime should be to inspire public confidence by guaranteeing that a foreign 
intelligence agency works with ‘propriety, effectiveness, transparency and 
government accountability’.11 The essential elements of this regime are statutory, 
                                                
7 Hannah et al (note 3) 12. 
8 Ibid. 
9 Hannah et al (note 3) 39.  
10 A Wright. ‘Casting a Light into the Shadows: Why Security Intelligence Requires Democratic 
Control, Oversight, and Review.’ In N LaViolette & C Forcese (eds) The Human Rights of Anti-
terrorism (2008, Irwin Law, Toronto) 328–329. 





judicial and supplementary controls such as international instruments, executive 
accountability and independent and legislative review bodies. These principles are 
set out in the Ottawa Principles on Anti-terrorism and Human Rights.12 However, 
although these principles were adopted at a conference as a model for best practice, 
they have not yet been recognised as an international standard. 
There are divergent views surrounding the independence of intelligence from 
policy bias. A three-pronged framework for identifying accountability solutions to 
this challenge has been offered: horizontal, vertical and third-dimensional:13  
 
‘Horizontal accountability refers to the restraint of state institutions by other state 
institutions, public agencies and the three branches of government (executive, 
legislative and judiciary) … vertical accountability concerns the hierarchical 
relationship between senior officials (principals) and their subordinates (agents) 
within a state institution … (and) third dimension refers to the role of international 
actors in holding a state institutional actor to account.’14  
 
It is the horizontal and third-dimensional accountability solution that become 
relevant as a guide for international law to be used by international actors in order to 
hold foreign intelligence agencies accountable.  
In international law, although there are statutory controls such as treaties, 
custom, principles and case law, and judicial controls like that of the International 
Court of Justice (ICJ), ad hoc tribunals and international courts such as the 
International Criminal Court (ICC), no accountable executive nor legislative review 
body exists. The absence of an external separation of powers and, as such, this 
missing accountability and review mechanism, undermines two elements essential to 
regulating democratic regimes. When a public authority or a private firm which is 
not traditionally governed by the controls relevant to foreign intelligence agencies 
owns personal information, international instruments govern how this information is 
handled.15 
 
                                                
12 C Forcese & N LaViolette. ‘Ottawa Principles on Anti-terrorism and Human Rights.’ The Human 
Rights of Anti-terrorism: A Colloquium (2007, Human Rights Research and Education Centre, 
Ottawa). 
13 M Caparini. ‘Controlling and Overseeing Intelligence Services in Democratic States.’ In H Born & 
M Caparini (eds) Democratic Control of Intelligence Services: Containing Rogue Elephants (2007, 
Ashgate Publishing, Hampshire) 7, 10. 
14 Caparini (note 13) 10. 





IV THE CHALLENGES TO EFFECTIVE OVERSIGHT OF FOREIGN 
INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES 
 
It has been debated whether the protection of state security should trump any 
objectives and values by which society attempts to constrain this power. An 
argument has been that it is the unique requirements and characteristics of foreign 
intelligence agencies that make effective oversight considerably challenging.16 This 
challenge becomes apparent when analysing the relationship between intelligence 
and policy, on the one hand, and accountability mechanisms, on the other. Whereas 
parliamentary oversight can cause problems such as an ongoing operation or source 
being compromised by information disclosed by a member or committee, 
parliamentarians’ insufficient security vetting and the politicisation of foreign 
intelligence agencies, independent judicial oversight brings with it the problems of 
sensitive information being shared outside of foreign intelligence circles.17  
Civil wars and their spillover, terrorist attacks and asymmetrical threats have 
characterised the post-Cold War era and necessitated what Rumsfeld called 
‘exquisite intelligence’.18 An asymmetrical threat is a threat disproportionate to the 
power of the state being threatened. Since September 2001, the multilateral counter-
terrorism co-operation of foreign intelligence has put operational transparency at risk 
and, in so doing, has further challenged the effective oversight of foreign intelligence 
liaison. Moreover, foreign intelligence services’ breaches of international law and 
human rights abuses overseas may trigger retaliation and risk the international 
standing of a state. Ultimately, the relations with states in which operations are being 
conducted or targeted by foreign intelligence agencies can be strained by the public 
disclosure of clandestine or covert operational information.19 
A suggested resolution to the challenge of effective oversight has been that 
fundamental political values be treated as a more important formal power and 
constraint over foreign intelligence services than international law. Specifically,  
 
                                                
16 Caparini (note 13) 4. 
17 Caparini (note 13) 13.  
18 H Born. ‘Towards Effective Democratic Oversight of Intelligence Services: Lessons Learned from 
Comparing National Practices.’ (2004) 3(4) Connections: The Quarterly Journal 2. 
19 H Born & I Leigh. ‘Democratic Accountability of Intelligence Services.’ (2007, Geneva Centre for 





‘(r)ather than legislation, it is the internalisation of these political values and ideas 
within the political culture, especially among the political elite, that provides the 
most essential indicator of democratic governance of the (internal) security sphere.’20  
 
It should be noted that this is not another way of saying that oversight is not 
necessary because the Executive will behave itself anyway. The internalisation of 
political values may therefore offer inroads towards international regulation of 
security intelligence agencies in liberal democracies, but less so towards international 
regulation of foreign intelligence agencies in those same liberal democracies.  
 
V FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE LIAISON 
 
The evolving nature of cross-border threats such as terrorist networks has 
necessitated that foreign intelligence agencies respond with cross-border co-
operation. The international co-operation of foreign intelligence agencies, or foreign 
intelligence liaison, has taken on the form of ‘pooling resources, trading information, 
drawing up common threat assessments and even circumvent(ing) domestic law’.21 
In particular, the problems associated with trading information and circumventing 
domestic law have highlighted the need for more effective oversight of national 
executives. 
An initial problem with trading information is that foreign intelligence 
agencies can be less compliant with the international law governing the pursuit of 
critical information – for instance, using torture to seek information – than other 
foreign intelligence agency partners.22 Additional concerns surrounding the 
circumvention of legal safeguards, controls and domestic law by foreign intelligence 
agency co-operation arise through the transfer of the personal data of nationals.23 Not 
only may the reckless use of the shared intelligence damage the sharer’s foreign 
intelligence operations but it may also support policies contrary to the moral 
compass, aims and interests of the sharer.  
Therefore, it has been agreed that the international co-operation of foreign 
intelligence agencies has to be founded on the ministerial approval of minimum 
safeguards through formal agreements and international legal obligations and 
                                                
20 Born & Leigh (note 19) 17. 
21 Born (note 18) 7. 
22 UNGA Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment 1984. 





frameworks.24 The 9/11 Commission in the United States25 and the Hutton Inquiry26 
and the Butler Commission27 in the United Kingdom are examples of potential legal 
foundations that could be used by the Executive to regulate the international co-
operation of foreign intelligence agencies effectively.28 Specifically, these inquiries 
have handled vital questions as to whether: 
• terrorists’ threats render increased legal resources and powers necessary for 
foreign intelligence agencies; 
• foreign intelligence is politicised by political leaders, and  
• the rule of law effectively governs the work of foreign intelligence officials.29 
 
(a) The globalisation of foreign intelligence liaison 
 
An argument has been posited that the fluid expansion of terrorist networks and cells 
is not merely a symptom of globalisation but that the origin of this instability and 
disruption is globalisation itself.30 While the fundamental connection between 
globalisation and terrorism was overshadowed by the events of September 2001, the 
challenges facing international regulation of foreign intelligence agencies has 
deepened as accountability mechanisms have not been able to keep up with the 
global expansion of foreign intelligence operations. The emergence of foreign 
intelligence liaison, particularly with regard to activities such as rendition, has seen 
extreme liaison secrecy, a dependence on foreign intelligence partnerships, the 
diffusion of foreign intelligence co-operation, multilateral co-operation in field 
operations and training, national infrastructural corporate providers and private 
security firms challenge the ability of international law to effectively monitor and 
oversee foreign intelligence agencies.31 
                                                
24 Born (note 18) 8. 
25 9/11 Commission. The 9/11 Commission Report 2004 1–567. 
26 B Hutton. Report of the Inquiry into the Circumstances Surrounding the Death of Dr David Kelly 
CMG. (2004, The Stationery Office, London) 1–328. 
27 R Butler. ‘Review of Intelligence on Weapons of Mass Destruction.’ Report of a Committee of 
Privy Counsellors (2004, The Stationery Office, London) 1–196. 
28 Born (note 18) 3. 
29 Born (note 18) 1. 
30 RJ Aldrich. ‘Global Intelligence Co-operation versus Accountability: New Facets to an Old 
Problem.’ (2009) 24(1) Intelligence and National Security 8. 





This international regulatory challenge posed by the globalisation of liaison 
has forced the development of accountability mechanisms at a national, regional and 
international level. Nationally, bi-annual International Intelligence Review Agencies 
Conferences’ and bilateral ‘accountability tourism’ have succeeded in establishing 
national best-practice standards but have not addressed the liaison itself.32 However, 
since September 2001, liaison has been approached nationally through standing 
committees such as that for the ‘Yellow Cake’ saga,33 special commissions of inquiry 
and judicial co-operation concerning Abu Omar’s rendition.34 The ‘Yellow Cake’ 
saga involved a standing committee that tampered with evidence about the existence 
of weapons of mass destruction in Niger and Iraq. While liaison may arguably be 
politically more effectively approached by a free media and press as opposed to 
standing committees or special commissions of inquiry, judicial co-operation over 
liaison is a form of legal accountability mechanism that is a more effective national 
accountability mechanism than political accountability equivalents.35 
Similarly, regional inquiries have functioned as a more effective tool for 
oversight over rendition than national mechanisms. This increased focus on a 
regional accountability mechanism has received notable attention in Europe through 
two connected inquiries carried out by the European Parliament and the Council of 
Europe. By pressurising national governments through published reports, reviewing 
Human Rights Law with the Venice Commission and researching European 
renditions, these institutions have been able to focus on the legal as opposed to the 
political structures governing foreign intelligence agencies.36 Inquiries by former 
Secretary-General, Terry Davis,37 and rapporteur Dick Marty38 via the Parliamentary 
                                                
32 Aldrich (note 30) 11–12. 
33 J Wilson. ‘What I Didn’t Find in Africa’ The New York Times 2003, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2003/07/06/opinion/what-i-didn-t-find-in-
africa.html?src=pm&pagewanted=1 (accessed on 25 November 2014); CW Ford ‘Niger/Iraq Uranium 
Story and Joe Wilson (S/NF)’ Unclassified Memorandum (2003) 1–3; National Intelligence Council 
‘Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction Programs’ NIC Draft Report (2002) 1–24; Director of Central 
Intelligence ‘Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction Programs’ CIA White Paper (2002) 1–25; British 
Government ‘British Government Briefing Papers on Iraq’ Declassified Draft of British Government’s 
White Paper (2002) 1–44; British Government ‘Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction: The Assessment 
of the British Government’ Final Version of British Government’s White Paper (2002) 1–51. 
34 Aldrich (note 30) 12; General Prosecutor at the Court of Appeals of Milan v Adler and Ors 
46340/2012 ILDC 1960 (IT 2012). 
35 Adler and Ors (note 34). 
36 Aldrich (note 30) 20. 
37 T Davis. ‘Secretary-General’s Report under Article 52 ECHR on the Question of Secret Detention 






Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) addressed liaison by drafting 
conventions. This was achieved through legal standards set in international treaties 
by member states such as the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR),39 the 
European Convention for the Prevention of Torture40 and its first judgment on 
rendition in the El Masri case.41 This sparked an inquiry by the European Parliament 
to develop a Temporary Committee on the alleged use of European countries by the 
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) for the transport and illegal detention of prisoners 
(TDIP). Indeed, the inquiry’s rapporteur, Giovanni Claudio Fava,42 expressly 
addressed the matters of rendition and liaison between foreign intelligence agencies 
in Europe. 
Foreign intelligence co-operation has also been approached at the 
international level, particularly by the United Nations. The Office of Investigation of 
the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the 
United Nations monitoring mission in Iraq in the 1990s set the precedent for the 
UN’s international intelligence inquiry into the assassination of the Prime Minster of 
Lebanon, Rafik Hariri, in 2005.43 This resulted in UN Security Council Resolution 
1595’s44 creation of the UN International Independent Inquiry Commission 
(UNIIIC).45 This international inquiry signifies the UN’s evolving perception of the 
pertinence of intelligence and of reviewing foreign intelligence activity, the potential 
                                                                                                                                     
Agencies’ Council of Europe Information Documents SG/Inf (2006) 5 1–50; T Davis ‘Secretary-
General’s Supplementary Report under Article 52 ECHR on the Question of Secret Detention and 
Transport of Detainees Suspected of Terrorist Acts, notably by or at the Instigation of Foreign 
Agencies’’ Council of Europe Information Documents SG/Inf (2006)13 1–35. 
38 D Marty ‘Alleged Secret Detentions and Unlawful Inter-state Transfers of Detainees involving 
Council of Europe Member States’ Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights Report (2006) 
Doc. 10957 1–76; D Marty ‘Alleged Secret Detentions and Unlawful Inter-state Transfers of 
Detainees involving Council of Europe Member States’ Committee on Legal Affairs and Human 
Rights Explanatory Memorandum (2007) AS/Jur 2007 36 1–72; D Marty ‘Abuse of State Secrecy and 
National Security: Obstacles to Parliamentary and Judicial Scrutiny of Human Rights Violations’ 
Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights Report (2011) Doc. 12714 1–23. 
39 ECtHR ‘European Convention on Human Rights’ Council of Europe (2002) 3–55. 
40 Aldrich (note 30) 21; ECtHR ‘European Convention for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment’ Council of Europe (2002) 3–33. 
41 El-Masri v the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia 39630/09.  
42 GC Fava ‘Report on the Alleged Use of European Countries by the CIA for the Transportation and 
Illegal Detention of Prisoners (2006/2200(INI))’ Temporary Committee on the Alleged Use of 
European Countries by the CIA for the Transportation and Illegal Detention of Prisoners Final 
Session Document (2007) A6-0020/2007 1–77.  
43 Aldrich (note 30) 25–27.  
44 UNSC ‘Res 1595’ Security Council Resolutions (2005) S/RES/1595 1–3. 
45 Aldrich (note 30) 28; M Detlev ‘Report of the International Independent Commission Established 
pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1595’ United Nations International Independent Commission 





use of foreign intelligence agencies’ neutrality and recognition of the role of foreign 
intelligence agencies in good governance.46 
The effectiveness of national committees appears limited to national contexts; 
free press, think tank, lobby group and non-governmental organisation (NGO) 
accountability is constrained by the absence of a democratic mandate and a lack of 
concern for such groupings’ effectiveness. This national level of activity appears to 
be where international legal best practice is likely to emerge and possibly regulate 
foreign intelligence liaison over time. In this regard, Inspector-Generals with 
enhanced operational authority in many countries are a recommended international 
legal alternative worth exploring with a regional bloc such as the North Atlantic 
Treaty Oganisation (NATO) or Brazil-Russia-India-China-South Africa (BRICS) or 
foreign intelligence partners such as the United States and the United Kingdom.47 
This even though their remit might be limited to holding internal inquiries and 
drafting investigative guidelines. 
 
(b) Intra-alliance foreign intelligence liaison 
 
Sun Zhu taught us that ‘it is as important to know yourself – and by extension your 
allies – as it is to know your enemies’.48 This lesson would suggest that foreign 
intelligence agencies’ collection, processing, analysis and dissemination of foreign 
intelligence about their own , their allies’  and their enemies’ foreign intelligence 
agencies is of paramount importance.49 
A strongly established and mutually trusting foreign intelligence liaison 
relationship is usually too valuable to risk breaching as a result of illegal or invasive 
activity in a host or allied state. Yet, the chapter on liaison was the sole chapter to be 
completely deleted from an official, recently declassified, internal history of the CIA 
in the 1950s.50 Therefore, it has been suggested that there is a close relationship 
between foreign intelligence agencies’ liaison partnerships and their secret 
intelligence activities. The challenge therefore to internationally regulating foreign 
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intelligence agencies would appear to be most apparent within foreign intelligence 
liaison, particularly with respect to rendition. 
 
(c) The utility of foreign intelligence liaison 
 
A Former Director-General of the UK’s Security Service (MI5), Sir Stephen Lander, 
has described the new phenomenon of ‘intelligence diplomacy’ as ‘the recognition 
by governments that there are relationships and understanding in their intelligence 
communities which can be used diplomatically’.51 The value that intelligence 
diplomacy has added to diplomatic relationships has rendered international 
intelligence collaboration all the more essential. It has therefore been argued that the 
essential determinant of international intelligence collaboration is the utility that 
sustains collaboration.52 
The distinct aspects behind international intelligence co-operation are the 
dissemination of intelligence-based assessments, the collaboration on operations and 
– most importantly – quality reporting disseminated from a single source whose 
primary information has been assessed. The reasons for the stamina behind 
international intelligence co-operation include the broader political relationships 
behind the intelligence relationship, long-term institutional partnerships and 
competent foreign intelligence allies. The routine use of intelligence as a collective 
asset in government, the operational history of institutional relationships and the 
mutual perception of the necessity of international intelligence co-operation also 
sustains foreign intelligence liaison.53  
However, barring certain specified organisations, domestic legislation does 
not often allow for the dissemination of the products of intelligence gathering beyond 
national borders.54 Therefore, Lander has argued that his utility test would be 
satisfied because ‘the risks and costs of sharing (one’s) own national material would 
be more than outweighed by the benefits of access to others’.55 Accordingly, a cost–
benefit analysis of the utility behind international intelligence co-operation appears 
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to offer a rationale as to why these international legal restrictions may be overlooked 
in practice. 
 
(d) Forms of foreign intelligence liaison 
 
Foreign intelligence agencies act mainly in support of their self-interest and their 
state’s foreign policy.56 When the costs, risks and benefits are understood as being 
inevitable, liaison ensues. These benefits include influencing the policies or conflict 
trajectory of other states, establishing diplomatic ties, lowering the costs of 
operations and sealing visible gaps. However, liaison may be restrained by: 
• the consequences of judicial practices;  
• legal issues;  
• dificulties with communication systems;  
• multi-levelled vetting; 
• a liaison ally’s poor history of human rights;  
• an unequal distribution of power, and  
• differences in foreign policy objectives and perceptions of threat.57 
 
Multilateral liaison is based on intelligence product sharing, targeting and coverage, 
the division of labour, sharing intelligence asset access and technology and burden 
sharing. Though the scope of multilateral liaison may be dependent on shared 
interests and common threat perceptions, differences in the culture , geography, 
experience and values such as trust and respect of the foreign intelligence agencies 
can render this reliance insufficient for establishing foreign intelligence liaison. In 
principle, information has a larger probability of being disclosed without authority 
the more broadly that information is shared. Moreover, the more parties that are 
involved, the more the comparative advantage of this information has resulted in 
rising costs and decreasing benefits, often because of unknown beneficiaries. 
Multilateral liaison rarely occurs in full confidence, therefore, because the methods 
of foreign intelligence gathering and the sources of intelligence cannot be guaranteed 
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complete protection: there are counterterrorism concerns, intelligence can be 
compromised, the fear of being penetrated is ever present.58  
Plurilateral liaison sees foreign intelligence exchanged at a more informal 
level through loosely structured informal clubs, groups and networks. With particular 
attention to shared problems and specific threats, information is shared among these 
groups less systematically and with more discretion.59 This form of liaison is 
generally based on governments’ sovereign discretion to share information. Although 
these plurilateral structures mutually enhance counterterrorism efforts through non-
reciprocal intelligence sharing, they are vulnerable to statutory obligations, policy 
prescriptions and laws.60 
Bilateral liaison is bound by the third-party rule which states that ‘intelligence 
supplied by a party to another cannot be shared with a third one without the 
originator’s consent’.61 Therefore, foreign intelligence co-operation occurs preferably 
via bilateral liaison. This form of liaison commonly includes joint operations and 
shared training facilities, raw product, assessments, synchronised intelligence 
systems, standardised vetting procedures, classification criteria and frequent 
meetings. While bilateral liaison can be set up either informally or formally, its focus 
on protecting foreign intelligence agencies’ intelligence and the equality of 
exchanges has seen formal bilateral liaison being accepted as the preferred form of 
foreign intelligence liaison.62 
 
(e) Managing bilateral intelligence liaison 
 
Managing bilateral liaison is difficult because diverse intelligence agencies have 
different directorates in their foreign relationships, varied exchange deals and means 
of disseminating intelligence with their foreign counterparts and different 
intelligence specialisations that may not be consistent with the organisational 
structures of foreign intelligence agencies. The bilateral relationships that should be 
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pursued are therefore those that are easier and safer to manage on the basis of clearly 
specified shared objectives.63 
Bilateral liaison can take the form of traditional alliances or new alliances 
between traditional adversaries. The war on terror, for instances, has seen liaison 
between traditional alliances expand. New alliances or renewed relationships liaison 
have centred mainly around Islamic terrorism and increased intelligence sharing in 
the greater Middle East, whereas non-traditional allies have included state sponsors 
of terrorism and non-traditional partners. However, the operational success of non-
traditional allies in combating terrorism has been undermined by political disputes 
with other governments.64 
In the context of the war on terror, multilateral liaison is actually a global 
network of bilateral liaison. In the long term, policy-makers will be challenged to 
defend their countries against threats of counterintelligence, while building useful 
alliances out of short-term tactical liaison. As liaison occurs not equally but 
asymmetrically, international law and norms should see to it that foreign policy 
decision-making is not manipulated or tailored by the abuse or misuse of foreign 
intelligence. Bilateral liaison should produce foreign intelligence that is not only 
trusted but also verifiable.65 
 
(f) Foreign intelligence liaison via rendition 
 
Legal systems and foreign and domestic policies frame the operations of liaison 
relationships. Not even allies will comply with requests that implicitly breach the 
domestic legitimacy of target activities or groups, privacy laws or statutory 
principles. However, the threat of terrorism can be used by foreign intelligence 
agencies as a reason for their not following the principle that foreign intelligence 
agencies do not perform operations in each others’ territory.66 
These counterterrorism measures have seen renditions occur where terrorists 
are transferred from the jurisdiction where they were detained to third countries in 
which brutal interrogations and detentions occur without due legal process. The 
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intelligence accrued from these extraordinary renditions has been traded for sensitive 
information, third-state intelligence and other exchanges with non-state actors. 
Therefore, liaison against counterterrorism between foreign intelligence agencies is 
often inconsistent with foreign policy and state liaison.67   
 
(g) The costs and benefits of foreign intelligence liaison 
 
A former US Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence Co-ordination and 
the US State Department’s first Co-ordinator for Intelligence Resources and 
Planning, Dr Jennifer E Sims, has described foreign intelligence liaison as a ‘form of 
subcontracted intelligence collection based on barter’.68 Foreign intelligence liaison 
can be characterised as a simple, complex, symmetrical, asymmetrical or adversarial 
relationship. Each form of foreign intelligence liaison brings with it different costs 
and benefits.69 
The bartering of intelligence gathering between parties is known as simple 
intelligence liaison. Complex intelligence liaison sees a blend of operational, 
military, economic or political intelligence-gathering assets bartered through foreign 
intelligence platforms. Symmetrical liaison arises when the trade via intelligence 
platforms is equitable to both parties. However, when one party receives more utility 
from liaison than the other, the result is asymmetrical liaison. Adversarial liaison 
entails co-operation between foreign intelligence agencies that is asymmetrically 
forced, joint gathering on behalf of adversarial foreign policy representatives or 
allied deception.70 
Foreign intelligence liaison can be calculated through the costs associated 
with loss if co-operation does not meet possible alternatives and direct gain, be it 
military, political or intelligence.71 The requisite counterintelligence to maintain the 
benefits of decisions made under competitive circumstances, even within alliances, is 
an example of co-operation costs.72 Even intelligence about one’s allies can be as 
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much of a cost to liaison as a cost of liaison that does not outweigh other military, 
political or intelligence gains. 
Targeting, communication and a covert presence can have benefits if the 
ethno-geographical or ethno-historical relationships of foreign intelligence liaisons 
are used. Counterintelligence that is effectively used by a smaller power can result in 
its asymmetrical benefit over a bigger power within that foreign intelligence 
relationship. Also, the foreign policy decisions of other parties can be influenced 
through foreign intelligence liaison and, in so doing, provide an agency with further 
benefit.73 
A state’s foreign intelligence liaison that is unable to withstand threats from 
others increases costs. Costs rise as a result of actionable intelligence through 
dangerous relationships and unverified information. The counterintelligence 
operations of other parties in foreign intelligence liaison increase costs. Classified 
source-based prosecutions of terrorists put the protection of the information at risk 
and, in turn, increase costs.74 
These costs and benefits have resulted in the international oversight of 
foreign intelligence liaison being endangered when: 
• the policies of governments develop with contradictory objectives;  
• foreign intelligence directorates’ liaison loses the benefits of intelligence 
gathering through too much caution, and  
• covert activities are undertaken without authority.  
 
Accountability for foreign intelligence liaison through bilateral co-ordination 
between ambassadors and foreign intelligence chiefs has been suggested as an 
additional accountability measure by which to regulate foreign intelligence liaison 
internationally. In addition, the Executive and Legislative branches of state 
governments should ensure that foreign intelligence liaison is neither politicised nor 
driving foreign policy.75  
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(h) Overcoming mistrust through foreign intelligence liaison 
 
States can engage in mutually fruitful liaison and overcome mistrust through pacts – 
international legal agreements – and institutions. This is because as the costs of 
breaching a pact increase, the provisions that enable states to track one another’s 
compliance with a pact garner further trust through institutions. Therefore, foreign 
intelligence dissemination would not only see better analysed and more openly 
dispersed intelligence between parties through institutions but also allow each party 
to track the way the beneficiary disseminates and uses the intelligence.76 
Foreign intelligence liaison could see more effective reform of foreign 
intelligence sharing through tracking and overseeing the foreign intelligence analysis 
and gathering of states through enlarged independent powers. Alternatively, liaison 
could be achieved through smaller groups’ encouraging safer foreign intelligence 
sharing between states. In the case of the enlarged independent powers, foreign 
intelligence sharing could be centralised and bolstered through making the sharing of 
credible foreign intelligence a prerequisite. Institutions could be empowered to 
monitor states’ compliance with this prerequisite through a separate analysis and 
gathering agency, for instance. In addition, an agency could be developed with the 
resources and staff to oversee and track foreign intelligence liaison between states’ 
respective agencies. In the case of smaller groups, realistically accepting that 
complete sharing will not evolve between mistrusting member states, a more cogent 
database network of foreign intelligence could be developed and groups of states’ 
policy-makers could be encouraged to hold more frequent meetings.77 These are 
policy suggestions for more effective liaison around intelligence. 
The enlarged independent powers could decrease the efficiency of effective 
foreign intelligence sharing through technical hurdles and excessive management; 
the sharing of foreign intelligence between different groups of states could create 
third-party misunderstandings about where the foreign intelligence is being sent. 
While decentralised foreign intelligence liaison may realise fewer overall gains in 
foreign intelligence sharing than an institutionally centralised alternative, the 
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decentralised option would probably be a more realistic and humble development in 
foreign intelligence sharing.78  
It has also been argued that foreign intelligence liaison via best-practice 
methods will develop trust between foreign intelligence agencies over time. In this 
context, foreign intelligence liaison may become more standardised and 
homogenised. Whereas this increased participation of foreign intelligence agencies 
may see benefits in the realm of policy, it should be noted that the implications for 
foreign intelligence liaison would necessitate significant methodological 




A state-centric as opposed to a private-sector definition of foreign intelligence has 
been suggested; the foreign intelligence process, organisation and product were 
differentiated, and it was argued that foreign intelligence requires clear mandates, 
central co-ordination, independent judicial oversight and independent parliamentary 
oversight and accountability. The suggested objectives of a regime for international 
law in liberal democracies were to create a democratic oversight, control and review 
regime of the propriety, effectiveness, transparency and government accountability 
over foreign intelligence liaison. Examples of the challenges to effective oversight of 
foreign intelligence liaison were apparent in executives, legislatures, judiciaries, 
foreign intelligence agencies and international instruments, while a three-pronged 
accountability mechanism was suggested.  
The evolving nature of international intelligence co-operation, the forms it 
takes and some of the problems associated with it require the international co-
operation of foreign intelligence among agencies to be founded on the ministerial 
approval of minimum safeguards through formal agreements, international legal 
obligations and frameworks. The need for the international regulation of foreign 
intelligence liaison has increased as accountability mechanisms have not been able to 
keep up with the global expansion of foreign intelligence operations. For this reason, 
national, regional and international accountability mechanisms were compared. It 
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was suggested that a close relationship exists between intra-alliance foreign 
intelligence agencies’ liaison partnerships and secret intelligence activities. 
A cost–benefit analysis of the utility behind international intelligence co-
operation appeared to offer a rationale as to why international legal restrictions may 
be overlooked in practice. This can occur when the law is interpreted as a cost by 
foreign intelligence agencies. Multilateral, plurilateral and bilateral forms of foreign 
intelligence liaison were then contrasted, with most states appearing to prefer more 
formal bilateral relationships. Bilateral intelligence liaison was categorised into 
traditional alliances, new alliances and traditional adversaries. And while those that 
should be pursued are those that are easier and safer to manage around clearly 
specified objectives, international law and norms should oversee that foreign policy 
decision-making is not manipulated or tailored by the abuse or misuse of foreign 
intelligence. Foreign intelligence liaison via rendition evidenced foreign intelligence 
agencies’ counterterrorism liaison as often being inconsistent with foreign policy and 
government liaison when terrorists are transferred from the jurisdiction where they 
were detained to third countries where brutal interrogations and detentions occur 
without due legal process. 
A cost–benefit assessment of simple, complex, symmetrical, asymmetrical 
and adversarial foreign intelligence liaison aimed at effectiveness indicated that the 
accountability of foreign intelligence liaison through bilateral co-ordination between 
ambassadors and foreign intelligence chiefs should enhance accountability measures. 
It also indicated that the executive and legislative branches of states should ensure 
that foreign intelligence liaison is neither being politicised nor driving foreign policy. 
An analysis of the advantages and disadvantages of centralised or decentralised 
foreign intelligence sharing reform suggested that decentralised foreign intelligence 
liaison would probably be a more realistic and humble development in foreign 
intelligence sharing but that significant methodological developments would be 








CHAPTER II: INTERNATIONAL REGULATION OF FOREIGN 




Chapter I argued that the globalisation of foreign intelligence liaison has resulted in 
the deepening of the challenges that confront the international regulation of foreign 
intelligence liaison. This is so because regulatory mechanisms have not been able to 
keep up with the global expansion of foreign intelligence operations. This emergence 
of foreign intelligence liaison, particularly with regard to SIGINT activities, has 
challenged the ability of international law effectively to regulate foreign intelligence 
agencies. While this challenge was set out in theory, the international regulatory 
challenge posed by the globalisation of liaison has also put pressure on national and 
regional regulation in practice.80 
Since the Snowden revelations of 2013, foreign intelligence liaison has 
become increasingly regulated by the judiciary at both the national and regional 
levels. State practice is summarised and analysed through a criticism of a recent 
landmark judgment in the United Kingdom – Liberty (The National Council of Civil 
Liberties) and Others v The Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth 
Affairs and Others (Liberty III).81 There it is argued that independent judicial 
oversight and supervision of foreign SIGINT liaison, particularly with regard to 
judicial pre-authorisation of communications interception warrants, shows that legal 
regulatory mechanisms are less subject to abuse or misuse than political controls.  
However, regional legal regulatory mechanisms are less effective tools for 
regulating SIGINT liaison than national legal regulatory mechanisms because, even 
though the threats to national security have become transnational, the solutions to 
such threats still generally lie within national jurisdictions. This is concluded through 
a prediction of the outcome of the current Liberty appeal (Liberty IV) to the European 
Court of Human Rights’ challenging the UK Investigatory Power Tribunal’s (IPT) 
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December 2014 ruling (Liberty II).82 The Liberty II case will function as a forecast 
that international regulation of foreign SIGINT liaison is more likely to take place at 
the national level in the short term.  
In the Liberty II case, which is criticised here, the IPT did not find the lack of 
judicial pre-authorisation for communications interception warrants to be 
problematic in the Liberty I case; in the Kennedy case, the Court was satisfied with 
the role of the Commissioner, and this reasoning was developed further in the 
Telegraaf Media case.83 My criticism of the Liberty II judgment centres on this 
position.  
I strongly disagree with the view that a lack of judicial pre-authorisation for 
communications interception warrants is not problematic. Communications 
interception is a form of SIGINT, just as SIGINT is a form of foreign intelligence 
liaison. It therefore follows that if foreign intelligence liaison should be subject to 
judicial regulation, so should communications interception warrants. Accordingly, I 
argue that judicial pre-authorisation for communications interception warrants should 
be obligatory. 
 
II NATIONAL REGULATION OF FOREIGN SIGINT LIAISON: LIBERTY II 




In the Liberty II judgment, Liberty, Privacy International, American Civil Liberties 
Union, Amnesty International, Bytes for All and others (the claimants) alleged that 
the actions assumed to be attributable to the Secretary of State for the Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office (Foreign Secretary), the Security Service (MI5), the Secret 
Intelligence Service (MI6) and the Government Communications Headquarters 
(GCHQ) [intelligence services] were unlawful because they violated the European 
Convention of Human Rights. As a result of Snowden’s leaks, the claimants asserted 
that their privacy had been unlawfully infringed. The judgment only assumed these 
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‘facts’ because of the Neither Confirm Nor Deny (NCND) policy.84 NCND is a legal 
principle that allows the respondents neither to confirm nor deny that a certain set of 
facts are true for reasons of national security.  
 With court oversight, the US government’s ‘Prism’ system collects SIGINT. 
Prism might have obtained the claimants’ private communications. Thereafter, the 
intelligence services might have received these private communications from the US 
government. The intelligence services might then have stored the claimants’ private 
communications as requested.85 The Prism disclosure was found to have been 
consented to by the respondents and could be declassified.86 
The information that was assumedly given by the NSA to the respondents 
was assumed by the IPT to have been lawfully obtained. After all, the United States 
is the centre of global telecommunications and a significant amount of international 
correspondence crosses its borders.87  
The Tribunal accepted that its specific function was to oversee complaints 
investigations and to co-ordinate its own rules in this regard.88 It was agreed that 
communications interception can take place without anyone listening to, seeing or 
reading the correspondence because it can occur through communications gathering 
and recording alone.89  
The Director of GCHQ, the Chief of MI6 and the Director-General of MI5 
are some of the few people who can make an application for interception warrants. 
Only the Secretary of State, acting as MI5’s Home Secretary and MI6 and GCHQ’s 
Foreign Secretary, can grant interception warrants subject to extraordinary 
circumstances. The complaints in the judgment deal with what are known as 
‘untargeted, strategic or certificated warrants’.90 
The Tribunal interpreted the Commissioner’s Report on the warrants and 
whether the respondents abused their bulk collection capabilities. The Commissioner 
highlighted the breadth of his supervisory role. A notable quantity of information 
was released into the public space as was consistent with national security.91 
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The claims were understood in two sections. The first issue dealt with the NSA’s 
Prism and ‘Upstream programme’ liaison with the respondents and the second issue 
addressed the alleged ‘Tempora interception operation’. The Tribunal interpreted 
Tempora as the ‘s 8(4)’ issue.92 
 The Prism issue was understood as follows: 
 
‘… does the statutory regime … satisfy the Art 8(2) “in accordance with the law” 
requirement?’93 
 
 The following four questions, according to the Tribunal, encapsulated the 
arguments on the s 8(4) issue: 
 
‘(1) Is the difficulty of determining the difference between external and internal 
communications, whether as a theoretical or practical matter, such as to cause the 
s 8(4) regime not to be in accordance with law contrary to Article 8(2)? (See 
definition of art 8(2) in part II (c) below.) 
 
(2) Insofar as s 16 of RIPA [Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act] is required as a 
safeguard in order to render the interference with Article 8 in accordance with law, 
is it a sufficient one? 
 
(3) Is the regime, whether with or without s 16, sufficiently compliant with the 
Weber requirements, insofar as such is necessary in order to be in accordance with 
law? (See explanation in part II(c) below.) 
 
(4) Is s 16(2) indirectly discriminatory contrary to Article 14 of the Convention 




The Tribunal allowed for ‘general challenges to the relevant legislative regime’ 
because it found legal standing for the claimants through the Kennedy v United 
Kingdom decision.95 This legal standing was allowed ‘in recognition of the particular 
features of secret surveillance measures and the importance of ensuring effective 
control and supervision of them’.96 General challenges applied to the claimants 
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because they were ‘unable to demonstrate that the impugned measures had actually 
been applied to them’ as followed in the Liberty I case.97  
 The Tribunal cleared up the matter of the ECHR protection by expressly 
citing art 8 of the ECHR: 
 
 ‘Right to Respect for Private and Family Life: 
 
1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his 
correspondence. 
 
2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right 
except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society 
in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well being of the 
country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or 
morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.’98 
 
 Foreign intelligence communications liaison between the United Kingdom 
and the United States is governed by a recently declassified bilateral UK–US 
Communication Intelligence Agreement dating from 1946.99 External 
communications were defined in s 8(4) Chap 5(1) of the Interception of 
Communications Code of Practice (Code) in line with s 71 of RIPA as: 
 
‘… those which are both sent or received outside the British Islands … whether or 
not they pass through the British Islands in course of their transit. They do not 
include communications both sent and received in the British Islands, even if they 
pass outside the British Islands en route.’100 
  
The Tribunal agreed with the claim made in the Commissioner’s Report that: 
 
‘The section 8(4) structure does not permit random trawling of communications. 
This would be unlawful. It only permits a search for communications referable to 
individuals the examination of whose communications are certified as necessary for 
a statutory purpose.’101 
 
 The lack of judicial pre-authorisation for communications interception 
warrants was not found to be problematic in the Liberty I case, in the Kennedy case 
the Court was content with the position of the Interception of Communications 
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Commissioner (the Commissioner) and this reasoning was further developed in the 
Telegraaf Media case.102  
 The IPT was satisfied that the s 8(4) programme was compliant with the 
Weber case prerequisites, they being the minimum statutory safeguards intended to 
avoid abuses of secret surveillance powers: 
  
‘… (1) the nature of the offences that may give rise to an interception order; (2) a 
definition of the categories of people liable to have their telephones tapped; (3) a 
limit on the duration of telephone tapping; (4) the procedure to be followed for 
examining, using and storing the data obtained; (5) the precautions to be taken when 
communicating the data to other parties; and (6) the circumstances in which 
recordings may or must be erased or the tapes destroyed.’103 
 
This application of the Weber requirements found authority in the Kennedy case 
judgment from the ECtHR. The IPT held that the signposting in the reports of the 




This part of my discussion now turns to the Liberty III judgment that was delivered 
on 6 February 2015, two months after the original Liberty II judgment was delivered 
on 5 December 2014. The facts, issues and laws pertaining to the Liberty II 
judgment, which are generally indistinguishable from the facts, issues and laws 
relating to the Liberty III judgment, have been summarised in part II (a), (b) and (c) 
above.  
The two remaining issues arising out of the Liberty II judgment dealt with in 
the Liberty III judgment were: 
 
‘(i) Whether by virtue of the fact that any of the matters now disclosed in the 
judgment of 5 December 2014 were not previously disclosed, there had prior thereto 
been a contravention of Articles 8 or 10 ECHR (The First Issue). 
 
(ii) Whether by virtue of the facts and matters set out in … the judgment of 5 
December 2014, there is a contravention of Articles 8 or 10 ECHR (The Second 
Issue).’105 
 
The Upstream and Prism program was applicable only to the first issue.106 
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 The Tribunal agreed with counsel Ryder’s submission that: 
 
‘It is only by reference to the Disclosures that [counsel was] satisfied that there was 
a sufficiently accessible indication to the public of the legal framework and any 
safeguards. In the absence of the Disclosures any such indications would have been 
insufficient and the intelligence sharing regime would not have been in “accordance 
with the law/prescribed by law”.’107 
 
The IPT conceded that there would not have been the sufficient signposting if the 
disclosures had not occurred. In this context, ‘legal signposting’ refers to legal 
information that is available to one via a legal expert. This required signposting was 
put in place through the Liberty III judgment.108 With regard to the second issue, 
identical safeguards should be applied for in a s 8(4) warrant to be referenced in an 




Consequently, the IPT’s Liberty III order declared: 
 
‘(i) that prior to the disclosures made and referred to in the First Judgment [Liberty 
II] and the Second Judgment [Liberty III], the regime governing the soliciting, 
receiving, storing and transmitting by UK authorities of private communications of 
individuals located in the UK, which have been obtained by US authorities pursuant 
to Prism and/or (on the Claimants’ case) Upstream, contravened Articles 8 or 10 
ECHR but, 
 
(ii) that it now complies with the said Articles.’110 
 
This was the first ruling in the 15-year history of the IPT’s jurisprudence to find the 
activities of the intelligence agencies arbitrary and unlawful. 
 
III NATIONAL REGULATION OF FOREIGN SIGINT LIAISON: CRITICISM OF 




                                                                                                                                     
106 Liberty III (note 82) at para 12.  
107 Liberty III (note 82) at para 19. 
108 Liberty III (note 82) at para 21.  
109 Liberty III (note 82) at para 26.  
110 Liberty (The National Council of Civil Liberties) and Others v The Secretary of State for Foreign 





Judicial pre-authorisation for communications interception warrants should be 
obligatory. The IPT’s argument for why a lack of judicial pre-authorisation for 
communications interception warrants is not a problem is insufficient. It cites only 
three cases as authority for this premise – the Liberty I, Kennedy and Telegraaf 
Media cases.  
 The first problem with this is that Liberty I, Kennedy and Telegraaf Media  
appeared before two different courts: Liberty I and Kennedy appeared before the 
ECHR and the Telegraaf Media case was heard before one of the highest courts in 
the Netherlands. Secondly, the three cases went about entirely different aspects of 
communications interceptions. The Liberty I case dealt with the interceptions of the 
applicants’ communications. The lawfulness of the granting of communications 
interception warrants was interpreted in the Kennedy case. The Telegraaf Media case 
involved the arbitrary and unlawful abuse of special state surveillance powers of 
communications interception.  
Moreover, the Court does not provide sufficient reasons as to why the lack of 
judicial pre-authorisation for communications interception warrants was not found to 
be problematic in the Liberty v UK case, why the Court was satisfied with the 
position of the Commissioner in the Kennedy case, and why this reasoning was 
developed in the Telegraaf Media case. This is not to say that the Court’s 
interpretation of the Liberty v UK, Kennedy and Telegraaf Media cases is inaccurate 
or misleading. It may, however, be incomplete.  
 I intend to apply a deeper analysis of the Court’s interpretation of the three 
cases in the hope of arriving at a more complete interpretation of the precedent. 
Below I reproduce the 15 lines out of the Liberty I case’ s 161-paragraph judgment 
that the IPT applied to this issue: 
 
‘There is also in our judgment no basis for objection by virtue of the absence for 
judicial pre-authorisation of a warrant. The United Kingdom system is for the 
approval by the highest level of government, namely by the Secretary of State. The 
absence of such judicial authorisation in Liberty [I] was not a matter of criticism, and 
the court in Kennedy concluded … that, whereas “it has previously indicated that in 
a field where abuse is potentially so easy in individual cases and could have such 
harmful consequences for democratic society as a whole, it is in principle desirable 
to entrust supervisory control to a judge”, it was satisfied, not only by virtue of the 
existence of the Commissioner (then, as now, a distinguished retired Judge), which it 
had examined at length … but also by virtue of the fact that “the Court highlights the 





interception”. This approval of the absence of judicial pre-authorisation was further 
addressed by the Court in Telegraaf Media.’111 
 
The fact that the UK system approves communications interception warrants 
through the Secretary of State does not mean that such a high level of government 
approval renders the interception immune to judicial oversight and accountability in 
a liberal democracy such as the United Kingdom.112 Judicial accountability 
mechanisms, such as those provided by an independent judge of the high court 
and/or court of appeal, are less inclined to party political bias or the abuse or misuse 
of foreign intelligence liaison than political accountability mechanisms in the form of 
a Secretary of State. Furthermore, judicial pre-authorisation of communication 
interception warrants could overcome mistrust in foreign intelligence liaison through 
international judicial best-practice methods that have been inspired by the Liberty I 
and Liberty II judgments.  
 
(i) Liberty I 
 
The absence of judicial authorisation was not raised in the Liberty I case.113 
However, this case can be distinguished on the facts from the Liberty II and Liberty 
III judgments before us. By distinguishing the facts of Liberty I from the facts of the 
Liberty II and Liberty III cases, it will become evident that simply because an 
absence of judicial pre-authorisation of communication interception warrants was not 
a matter of criticism in the Liberty I case does not mean that we should not be deeply 
critical of its absence in Liberty II and as a general rule. Such judicial pre-
authorisation could and should become an international judicial best practice.  
 On the facts of Liberty I, the applicants alleged that the Defence Ministry’s 
Electronic Test Facility (ETF) intercepted thousands of public telephone, facsimile 
and email communications that were radio channeled between Telecom’s radio 
stations in Dublin and London.114 However, the facts of the Liberty II and Liberty III 
judgments showed that the United States is the centre of global telecommunications 
and a far more significant amount of international correspondence moves through its 
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borders.115 According to Glen Greenwald, the journalist who leaked the Snowden 
revelations on which the facts of Liberty II and Liberty III are based, the bulk of 
private communications intercepted by the United States and the United Kingdom 
number well into the billions.116 Therefore, in addition to the fact that the US–UK 
bulk interceptions capabilities are active on a global scale and not only between the 
United Kingdom and Ireland, we cannot begin to compare the facts of a case where 
10 000 telephone channels were alleged to have been intercepted with the facts of a 
case where Greenwald exposed that ‘PRISM allows the NSA to collect data directly 
from the servers of nine of the biggest internet companies’ – gmail, facebook, 
hotmail, yahoo, google, apple, skype, aol and youtube.117 This distinguishability may 
not apply to the legal principles but it does appear to apply to the facts. Therefore, 
the scale of bulk communications interceptions in the Liberty v UK case is factually 
distinguishable from those of the Liberty I and Liberty II judgments.  
 Moreover, the need for an independent judge of the high court and/or court of 
appeal as opposed to the existence of the Commissioner is evidenced by three 
criticisms of the Commissioner in the Liberty v UK case. First, on a point of relevant 
domestic law and practice, the Commissioner’s safeguard does not routinely account 
for pre-judicial authorisation of a warrant in practice. That is, the role is merely one 
of restrospective supervision and oversight to ensure that warrants were granted in 
accordance with the statute and for checking procedural appropriateness. The 
potential abuse and misuse of foreign intelligence liaison highlighted in Chapter I is 
accordingly not prevented by the Commissioner’s ‘safeguard.’118  
Secondly, also on a point of relevant domestic law and practice, the 
Commissioners have no capacity to review whether the interception of 
communications security arrangements (‘arrangements’) had been achieved on a 
case-by-case (individual) basis even though they are generally authorised to review 
the arrangements’ adequacy – which entirely undermines the horizontal 
accountability solution suggested in Chapter I.119 (Chapter I’s horizontal 
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accountability solution refers to the restraint of state institutions by other state 
institutions, public agencies and the three branches of government.)  
Thirdly, with regard to the independence and powers of oversight and 
supervision of the Commissioners, because the Commissioner’s reports were unable 
to open the arrangements to public scrutiny and knowledge, the Commissioners’ 
conclusions on compliance with the arrangements did not enhance access to or the 
certainty of the programme.120 Therefore, the Liberty II and Liberty III conclusion 
that the lack of judicial authorisation was not an issue that was criticised is 
problematic.  
 
(ii) Kennedy  
 
The potential for the abuse or misuse of foreign intelligence liaison necessitates that, 
particularly in a liberal democratic society, an independent judge of the high court 
and/or court of appeal play a role in controlling supervision and oversight. However, 
the precedent set by the Kennedy case below suggests that the advantages of the IPT 
as highlighted in part III (b)(i) renders the IPT preferable to the Commissioner in 
being entrusted with supervision and oversight of the authorisation for 
communication interception warrants in the United Kingdom. It is, nonetheless, 
important to note that the advantages of the IPT’s supervisory and oversight role in 
the judicial authorisation for communications interception warrants, while 
investigatory, is retroactive. Moreover, as with the criticism of the role of the 
Commissioner identified in part III (b)(i), it does not function as a judicial pre-
authorisation of communications interception warrants – the supervisory control of 
the IPT is subject to the whim of the Executive through the Secretary of State. The 
potential for unlawful and arbitrary abuse or misuse of foreign intelligence liaison is 
therefore is such that it can only be remedied but not prevented by the courts.  
 On the background facts surrounding the circumstances of the Kennedy case, 
an applicant who had been found guilty of manslaughter in 1994 was suspicious that 
his communications had been intercepted via mail, telephone and email in 1996 and 
alleged that interception warrants continued to be unlawfully granted by the security 
                                                





services to disadvantage his business and for intimidation purposes.121 As with the 
comparison of the facts of the Liberty I case to Liberty II and Liberty III in part III 
(b)(i) above, we cannot fairly compare the circumstances of a case where one man 
with a criminal record alleges that the security services unlawfully and arbitrarily 
intercepted his communications to a case that involves the UK foreign intelligence 
liaison with the US centre of global communications and the almost immeasurable 
quantity of international correspondence that this liaison is responsible for. The 
circumstances surrounding the facts of the Kennedy case and those surrounding the 
facts of the Liberty II and Liberty III judgments can, therefore, not be compared for 
the same reasons that the factual circumstances of the Liberty I case could not be 
compared with the facts of the Liberty II and Liberty III judgments with regard to the 
scale of bulk communications interceptions.  
 With regard to the applicable legislation governing the relevant domestic law 
and practice of the Commissioner, it first appears worth noting that in terms of 
inspections, the Commissioner’s 2005–2006 report highlighted that the warrant 
samples are chosen randomly in a biannual review. This is disconcerting because it is 
arbitrary.122 Secondly, the Commissioner’s 2001 report identified that, though 
practically highly improbable, it is possible in theory for procedures overseeing the 
authorisation of warrants to be circumvented. However, a theoretical possibility is 
not acceptable in the realm of national security and the right to private and family life 
because if something is theoretically possible, then it is by definition not 
impossible.123 Thirdly, the Commissioner’s 2005–2006 report similarly was of the 
opinion that codes, safeguards and legislation render it almost impossible for private 
communications to be intentionally intercepted unlawfully is sufficient. This 
oversight and supervision also does not avoid the theoretical possibility of an 
intentionally unlawful interception of private communications.124 Fourthly, in 2004 
the Commissioner claimed that the Secretary of State can deny a warrant application 
for reasons of necessity and proportionality but it should be the function of an 
independent Judiciary and not the Executive to determine what is and/or is not 
necessary and proportional in authorising warrants for the interception of private 
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communications.125 Fifthly, even the Commissioner felt that the 24 interception 
mistakes and contraventions accounted for in the 2007 report were excessive. 126 
Excessive errors are a slippery slope towards arbitrary and unlawful abuses and 
misuses of foreign intelligence, as cautioned in Chapter I, as opposed to evidence 
that no intentional abuse of interception of private communications powers is 
occurring, as the Kennedy case concludes.127 
 This conclusion established that the supervision necessary to avoid an abuse 
of foreign intelligence liaison stems, in part, from the extensive role of the IPT’s 
oversight of communications interceptions: 
 
‘The Court recalls that it has previously indicated that in a field where abuse is 
potentially so easy in individual cases and could have such harmful consequences 
for democratic society as a whole, it is in principle desirable to entrust supervisory 
control to a judge. In the present case, the Court highlights the extensive jurisdiction 
of the IPT to examine any complaint of unlawful interception. Unlike in many other 
domestic systems, any person who suspects that his communications have been or 
are being intercepted may apply to the IPT. The jurisdiction of the IPT does not, 
therefore, depend on notification to the interception subject that there has been an 
interception of his communications. The Court emphasises that the IPT is an 
independent and impartial body, which has adopted its own rules of procedure. The 
members of the tribunal must hold or have held high judicial office or be 
experienced lawyers. In undertaking its examination of complaints by individuals, 
the IPT has access to closed material and has the power to require the Commissioner 
to provide it with any assistance it thinks fit and the power to order disclosure by 
those involved in the authorisation and execution of a warrant of all documents it 
considers relevant. In the event that the IPT finds in the applicant’s favour, it can, 
inter alia, quash any interception order, require destruction of intercept material and 
order compensation to be paid. The publication of the IPT’s legal rulings further 
enhances the level of scrutiny afforded to secret surveillance activities in the United 
Kingdom.’128 
 
 With regard to the Kennedy judgment’s argument for the independence, 
oversight and supervisory implementation capacity of the Commissioner,129 the IPT 
raises sound arguments in Liberty II and Liberty III. These arguments suggest a 
preference for the IPT’s potential to pre-authorise communications interception 
warrants rather than the Commissioner.130 First, the IPT is empowered to create 
continual inspections and investigations in accordance with its own rules and 
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procedures.131 Secondly, the IPT’s hearings benefit from arguments between 
parties.132 Thirdly, the IPT can hold a hearing in public based on facts that are 
assumed.133 Fourthly, arrangements can be analysed by the IPT in a closed hearing 
and it can access all information even if it is secret.134 Fifthly, the IPT can decide 
whether matters that it hears in closed chambers can be openly disclosed and 
publicised.135 The Liberty II and Liberty III judgments consequently concluded that 
the presence of the Commissioner was examined in depth and that and the 
jurisdiction of the IPT is extensive.136 However, it is clear that the role of the 
Commissioner was not examined in length and the jurisdiction of the IPT is not 
satisfactorily extensive.  
 
(iii) Telegraaf Media  
 
On the facts, Telegraaf Media Nederland Landelijke Media BV (Telegraaf Media) 
and two journalists complained that the state secret service’s (AIVD) special powers 
of transcription and interception of their telecommunications recordings involved 
surveillance that was too extensive, stored for too long and therefore arbitrary and 
unlawful.137 However, Telegraaf Media did not allege that the governmental 
supervisory and monitoring procedures were insufficient.138 Following a similar line 
of reasoning to my criticism of the Liberty I and Kennedy cases in part III (b)(i) and 
(ii) above, we must differentiate the facts of this case where a media company and 
two journalists complained about the unlawfulness and arbitrariness of the excessive 
and overextended storage of their intercepted communications by the AIVD from 
those in Liberty II and Liberty III (where four international NGOs complained about 
the arbitrary and unlawful interceptionof their and billions of other communications, 
which occurred out of the US core of the global telecommunications network). The 
factual circumstances of the Telegraaf Media case are comparable to those of the 
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Liberty II and Liberty III judgments because of the scale of the bulk communications 
interceptions. 
 The Liberty I and Kennedy precedents followed in this case reiterated that 
there is an eminent risk of arbitrariness when the secretive powers of the Executive 
are made use of because the rule of law is not in accord with such a potentially 
uncontrolled discretionary power.139 However, in this case, the Court found that the 
authorisation of the government’s special powers was not subjected to an 
independent review body empowered to prevent or end this authorisation before the 
communications were intercepted, and that, once the confidence of journalists’ 
sources had been breached, it could not be restored.140 This absence of judicial pre-
authorisation for communications interception warrants had clearly been a point of 
concern in the Liberty I, Kennedy and Telegraaf Media cases, in which an arbitrary, 
uncontrolled abuse and misuse of executive discretionary power contrary to the rule 
of law was at issue. Thus, for Liberty II to have interpreted the Telegraaf Media case 
as having dealt with approving the absence of judicial pre-authorisation is an 
inaccurate analysis of the case. There is, therefore, even more motivation for Chapter 
I’s recommendation of a horizontal accountability solution to be applied to the 
judicial pre-authorisation of communications interception warrants in foreign 
intelligence liaison.  
The Telegraaf Media ruling compared the independent supervision of 
communications interceptions by the Dutch Commission in the Klass v Germany 
case against that of the IPT and the Commissioner in the Kennedy v UK case: 
 
‘However, in both cases [Klass v Germany and Kennedy v UK] the court was 
prepared to accept as adequate the independent supervision available. In Klass v 
Germany, this included a practice of seeking prior consent to surveillance measures 
of the Commission, an independent body chaired by a president who was qualified 
to hold judicial office and which moreover had the power to order the immediate 
termination of the measures in question. In Kennedy v UK the court was impressed 
by the interplay between the Investigatory Powers Tribunal, an independent body 
composed of persons who held or had held high judicial office and experienced 
lawyers which had the power, among other things, to quash interception orders, and 
the Interception of Communications Commissioner, likewise a functionary who held 
or had held high judicial office and who had access to all interception warrants and 
applications for interception warrants.’141 
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The independent supervision purported to be adequate appears rather 
inadequate for the same reasons as found in my criticism of the Liberty I and 
Kennedy cases in part III(b)(i) and (ii) above. The Commission’s prior agreement for 
surveillance in the Klass case and the interplay between the IPT and the 
Commissioner in the Kennedy case are simply incomparable. This is because judicial 
pre-authorisation for surveillance by a Commission is an example of the judicial pre-
authorisation for communications interception warrants argued for in Chapter II, 
whereas the interplay between the IPT and the Commissioner is an example of the 
retroactive authorisation of communications interception warrants criticised in part 
III (b)(i) and (ii) above. Therefore, the acceptance of the lack of judicial pre-
authorisation was in fact not further dealt with in the Telegraaf Media case as the 
Liberty II judgment claims.142 
This comparison further reveals that independent judicial oversight, 
supervision and accountability of foreign intelligence liaison is unavoidably subject 
to abuse and misuse in a liberal democracy. Legal systems should frame the 
operations of and not retroactively react to foreign intelligence liaison relationships 
and international best practices. The precedent created by the Liberty I, Kennedy and 
Telegraaf Media judgments was criticised because these cases offered unconvincing 
reasons for why judicial pre-authorisation of communications interceptions warrants 
should not be obligatory. However, the precedent created by the Liberty I and Liberty 
II judgments and order with regard to the unlawfulness and arbitrariness of the 
foreign intelligence agencies’ activities should be encouraged as a means of 




I have argued that independent judicial oversight and supervision of foreign SIGINT 
liaison, particularly with regard to judicial pre-authorisation of communications 
interception warrants, are more effective national regulatory mechanisms than 
political regulatory mechanisms as they are less likely to be subject to abuse or 
misuse. This was borne out in the criticism of the Liberty II case, which also 
                                                





functioned as a forecast that international regulation of foreign SIGINT liaison is 
more likely to happen at the national level in the short term.  
The argument that there must be judicial pre-authorisation of communications 
interception warrants should have been posited in the Liberty II judgment. This is 
because the actions of the intelligence services were unlawful as they violated arts 8 
and 10 of the ECHR and as the IPT’s role was shown to be the oversight of 
complaint investigations of, in this case, untargeted, strategic or certified warrants. 
The lack of judicial pre-authorisation of communications interception warrants was 
not found to be problematic in the Liberty I case. The Kennedy case saw the Court 
satisfied with the position of the Commissioner for similar reasons to those in the 
Telegraaf Media case. The IPT’s ruling in the Liberty II case that the signposting in 
the reports of the Commissioner, the Code and the statute was adequate was shown 
to be highly problematic. This was shown by the applications in the Liberty III 
judgment, where the Tribunal conceded that there would not have been the sufficient 
signposting if the disclosures had not occurred. Moreover, the IPT declared that the 
communications interception regime contravened arts 8 and 10 of the ECHR.  
My criticism of Liberty II showed that the court’s interpretation, application 
and development of the relevant Liberty I, Kennedy and Telegraaf Media precedents 
was incomplete. Judicial accountability mechanisms were argued to be less subject to 
party political bias and the abuse, misuse and mistrust of foreign intelligence liaison 
than to political accountability mechanisms. The circumstances of the Liberty, 
Kennedy and Telegraaf precedents were all shown to be different on the facts and 
incomparable to those of Liberty II and Liberty III, mostly for reasons of the scale or 
quantity of bulk communications interceptions.  
The Liberty I case taught us that the Commissioner can supervise and oversee 
only retrospectively, does not have the capacity to review communications 
interceptions security arrangements and that compliance with arrangements did not 
enhance programme access or certainty. We learnt more about the Commissioner 
from the Kennedy case in that, while the IPT’s investigations were retroactive at best, 
the Commissioner’s role duplicates duties, their review of communications 
interceptions is arbitrary, it is theoretically possible for the oversight of warrants 
authorisation to be bypassed and for the interception errors to be excessive. It was 
suggested that it should be the function of an independent judiciary to determine 





On these criticisms, Liberty II and Liberty III convincingly showed the IPT as 
being preferable to the Commissioner for pre-authorising communications 
interception warrants. But the Telegraaf Media case ultimately showed us that the 
absence of judicial pre-authorisation of communications interception warrants is a 
point of concern because arbitrary, uncontrolled abuse and misuse of executive 
discretionary power that is contrary to the rule of law can be the outcome. Moreover, 
its comparison of the Klass and Kennedy cases was criticised because judicial pre-
authorisation for surveillance by a commission in the Klass case was an example of 
judicial pre-authorisation for communications interception warrants argued for in 
Chapter II, whereas the interplay between the IPT and the Commissioner in the 
Kennedy case was an example of the retroactive authorisation for communications 


























CHAPTER III: INTERNATIONAL REGULATION OF FOREIGN 




Chapter I reviewed the international regulation of foreign intelligence liaison and 
Chapter II summarised and criticised the international regulation of foreign 
intelligence liaison through a legal analysis of the relevant case law. Chapter III 
analyses the international regulation of foreign intelligence liaison through a case 
study. The case study focuses on the regulation of SIGINT in South Africa, and on 
national and regional applications of art 17 of the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights (ICCPR) with regard to private communications. Ultimately, 
legal reform is suggested through a General Intelligence Laws Amendment Bill 
(GILAB) 2015.  
 Part II (a) defines the problem in law, what SIGINT is, how it is intercepted 
and whether it is regulated. Part II (b) presents an executive summary of the legal 
issues. Here, the chapter on ‘Interception of Communication and the National 
Communications Centre (NCC)’ in the 2008 Ministerial Review Commission on 
Intelligence Report, which defined three legal problems, is reviewed. Legal problems 
arose because SIGINT monitoring was not constitutional, the National Strategic 
Intelligence Amendment Bill (NCC Bill) had insufficient protections against privacy 
infringements, and the NIA (National Intelligence Agency) policy on 
communications interceptions was not consistent with the constitution and the 
legislation then currently in force. For these reasons, the NCC Bill, which offered a 
definition of SIGINT and provided for the functions of the NCC, was withdrawn on 
15 October 2008. Moreover, the NCC’s SIGINT seemed unlawful and 
unconstitutional in not complying with RICA’s requirements of judicial pre-
authorisation for communications interceptions.  
 Part II (c) analyses the legal issues surrounding the NCC, the NCC interim 






 Part III of the chapter was originally written as part of a group research paper 
on national and regional applications of art 17 of the ICCPR with regard to private 
communications.143 Part III (a) analyses the legal framework, scope and limitations, 
and development and interpretation of the right in South Africa. Part III (b) compares 
the legal framework, scope and limitations, and development and interpretation of 
the right in Africa.  
Part IV takes the form of the solution: the General Intelligence Laws 
Amendment Bill 2015. The Bill was drafted as a private member’s Bill for the South 
African Shadow Minister for Defence and Military Veterans, David Maynier, 
between 14 January 2015 and 13 February 2015. The definitions, functions, 
components and matters connected therewith have been sourced from South African 
legislation and foreign legislation from Australia, New Zealand, the United Kingdom 
and the United States.  
 
II REGULATION OF SIGINT IN SOUTH AFRICA 
 
(a) Defining the problem in law 
 
(i) What is signals intelligence, how is it intercepted and is it regulated? 
 
The National Communications Centre (NCC) intercepts SIGINT as per the State 
Security Agency’s (SSA) counter-intelligence function, mandated by the National 
Strategic Intelligence Act (NSIA).144 However, the withdrawal of the NCC Bill on 15 
October 2008 means that 
• s 1 of the NSIA has not been amended to include the definition of SIGINT;  
• s 2 of the NSIA has not been amended to provide for the functions of the NCC, 
and  
• s 3 of the Intelligence Services Act (ISA) has not been amended to provide for 
the government components that absorb into and make up the SSA.145 
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Consequently, SIGINT and the NCC are not regulated by the NSIA or the ISA. 
However, the NCC should be regulated by the NSIA, the ISA and the Regulation of 
Interception of Communications and Provision of Communication-related 
Information Act (RICA) because the SIGINT collected by the NCC fall within 
RICA’s definition of ‘intercept’ and ‘indirect communication’, as per s 1(1) of 
RICA.146 As will be discussed, government practice seems to suggest that neither 
SIGINT nor the NCC has been regulated effectively by RICA. 
 
(b) Summary of the legal issues 
 
The chapter on ‘Interception of Communication and the NCC’ in the 2008 
Ministerial Review Commission on Intelligence Report’s defined three core legal 
problems.147 First, the NCC seemed to have been involved in SIGINT monitoring in 
a way that was neither constitutional nor lawful because it was not compliant with 
legislation or the constitution. Secondly, the NCC Bill did not include sufficient 
protections against infringements of the right to privacy. Thirdly, the National 
Intelligence Agency’s (NIA) policy on communications interception was inconsistent 
with the constitution or the then current legislation.148  
The NCC’s SIGINT seemed to be unlawful and unconstitutional because it 
was not compliant with the requirements of RICA that necessitate judicial pre-
authorisation in order for communications interceptions to be permissible.149 As will 
be seen in the case law in part III (a)(iii) of this chapter, the Constitutional Court has 
emphasised the necessity for legislative protections when privacy is being infringed. 
The changes to the NCC Bill, which encapsulate the NCC’s functions, might make 
the Bill constitutional. The NIA Directive on Communications Monitoring and 
Interception (NIA policy) limited the right to privacy to citizens but this limitation is 
not consistent with the applicability of this right to all in South Africa.150   
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(c) The legal issues in detail 
 
(i) The National Communications Centre (NCC) 
 
Section 14(d) of the South African Bill of Rights enshrines the right not to have the 
privacy of one’s communications infringed.151 Accordingly, s 2 of RICA does not 
permit communications interceptions.152 However, an exception to s 2 is s 16, which 
permits law-enforcement or security services to intercept communications.153 As a 
protection within s 16, judicial pre-authorisation is most important to this exception. 
The protections are indicative of the will of the Legislature and the Executive to 
safeguard the right to the privacy of one’s communications, and at the same time to 
justify infringements and independently oversee interceptions that are lawful.154  
RICA regulates the NCC, in part because the SIGINT collected by the NCC 
fall within RICA’s definition of ‘intercept’ and ‘indirect communication’, as per 
s 1(1) of RICA.155 Therefore, the NCC’s SIGINT must be RICA compliant. 
However, whether the NCC Bill will be tabled again is unclear because there has 
been no evidence of its being revisited since it was withdrawn in 2008.156 
 
(ii) The NCC interim policy 
 
The NCC interim policy tried to bolster the internal checks and balances of the NCC 
through regulation. However, the policy did not refer to RICA and the legal duty of 
judicial pre-authorisation of NCC communications interceptions.157 It should also be 
noted that the discussion under part II (c)(ii), (iv) and (v) of this chapter is limited 
due to the classification of the NCC, NIA and SASS policies under analysis. 
Although the NCC Bill is not classified, any policy of the NCC, NIA or SASS is 
technically classified. 
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(iii) The NCC Bill 
 
The functions and purposes of the NCC were defined by the NCC Bill. 
Constitutionally, the Bill’s reasons for SIGINT communications interceptions 
applications seemed too broad to justify any infringement of the right to privacy. 
These grounds would have even permitted state SIGINT over lawful private 
communications.158 
The NCC Bill did not cater for judicial pre-authorisation of NCC SIGINT 
because ministerial approval was considered to be a sufficient alternative to judicial 
pre-authorisation by those who wrote the Bill. The foreign law of the ‘five eyes’ 
SIGINT alliance (Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom and the 
United States) would not be applicable in other constitutional jurisdictions where 
judicial pre-authorisation of communications interceptions was a prerequisite. 
Lawful SIGINT authorised by both ministers and the judiciary should also have been 
considered by the drafters of the Bill.159 
RICA’s requirement that intelligence officials must obtain judicial pre-
authorisation of communications interception was not sufficiently provided by the 
NCC Bill. The assumption that judges cannot be entrusted with classified 
information is ill-founded: RICA provides for a designated judge whose very role 
challenges this assumption.160 
 
(iv) The NIA Policy 
 
The NIA policy regulates SIGINT operationally and managerially.161 As mentioned 
in the summary above, the NIA policy’s statutory interpretation is flawed because the 
protection of the right applies to all in South Africa.162 That is, the protection does 
not apply only to South Africans but all who live in South Africa. The NIA cannot 
make up different levels of rights protection. Therefore, the NIA and other 
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intelligence organisations are acting outside of the constitution and the law if they 
undertake communications interceptions without judicial pre-authorisation.163  
 
(v) The SASS policy 
 
The summary of RICA contained in the South African Secret Service (SASS) Policy 
on Interception of Communications (SASS policy) does not include RICA sections 
about the legislative grounds for communications interceptions warrant applications 
by the intelligence services. However, policies are subject to legislation, whether 
they include it or not. The SASS policy also states that the SASS director-general 
should take it upon him- or herself to consent to such policy changes as are deemed 
best for the service.164 This is not conducive to rules and procedures of good 
governance.165  
 
III NATIONAL AND REGIONAL APPLICATION OF ART 17 OF THE ICCPR 
WITH REGARD TO PRIVATE COMMUNICATIONS 
 
Article 17 of the ICCPR states that: 
 
‘1. No one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his privacy, 
family, home or correspondence, nor to unlawful attacks on his honour and 
reputation. 
 
2. Everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such interference or 
attacks.’166 
 
This article has been incorporated into South African law, and this part of Chapter III 
studies the extent to which art 17 of the ICCPR has been applied in South African 
law and African regional law. At a national level, the constitutional and statutory 
framework, scope and limitations, and the courts’ development and interpretation of 
the right are set out. At a regional level, I study the African Charter on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights (Banjul Charter), the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights (Commission), the African Court on Justice and Human Rights (African 
Court) and the respective protocols. 
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(a) South Africa 
 
(i) Legal framework 
 
Section 14(d) of the South African Bill of Rights enshrines the right not to have the 
privacy of one’s communications infringed.167 Accordingly, s 2 of RICA does not 
permit communications interceptions.168 
 
(ii) Scope and limitations 
 
However, an exception to s 2 is s 16, which permits intelligence services to intercept 
communications.169 Judicial pre-authorisation of communications interception 
warrants is the most important of the protections against this exception. The 
protections are indicative of the will of the Legislature and Executive to safeguard 
the right, justify infringements and independently oversee interceptions that are 
lawful.170  
 
(iii) Development and interpretation 
 
In Bernstein v Bester, Ackermann J characterised the sphere of the right to privacy 
on a continuum: 
 
‘A very high level of protection is given to the individual’s intimate personal sphere 
of life and the maintenance of its basic preconditions and there is a final untouchable 
sphere of human freedom that is beyond interference from any public authority. So 
much so that, in regard to this most intimate core of privacy, no justifiable limitation 
thereof can take place. But this most intimate core is narrowly construed. This 
inviolable core is left behind once an individual enters into relationships with 
persons outside this closest intimate sphere; the individual’s activities then acquire a 
social dimension and the right of privacy in this context becomes subject to 
limitation.’171 
 
Ackermann J’s reasoning was followed by Langa J in the Hyundai case:  
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‘[P]rivacy is a right which becomes more intense the closer it moves to the intimate 
personal sphere of the life of human beings, and less intense as it moves away from 
that core.’172  
 
In the Hyundai and Park-Ross173 cases, the Court interpreted the intensity of the 
sphere of the right by emphasising the importance of judicial authorisation for 
infringements of the right.174 
Even if the ICCPR had not been incorporated in South Africa, the Court has 
used unincorporated conventions as criteria for reviewing the validity of domestic 
legislation:175 
 
‘[T]he reasonableness of parliamentary action to give effect to a provision in the Bill 
of Rights should be tested against obligations undertaken by the Republic when 




(i) Legal framework 
 
The Banjul Charter does not expressly protect the right not to have the privacy of 
one’s communications infringed.177 However, the Protocol on the Statute of the 
African Court of Justice and Human Rights (Protocol) regards international treaties, 
international custom and general principles of law expressly as applicable law.178 
International treaties, international custom and general principles of law all protect 
the right.179 Therefore, the African Court must have regard to the right in carrying 
out its functions. 
Similarly, the Commission draws applicable principles expressly from: 
 
‘… international law on human and peoples’ rights … the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights, other instruments adopted by the United Nations … in the fields of 
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human and peoples’ rights as well as from the provisions of various instruments 
adopted within the Specialised Agencies of the United Nations ….’180 
 
The Commission must also consider as subsidiary applicable principles ‘… 
general or special international conventions … customs generally accepted as law … 
legal precedents and doctrine …’.181 International human-rights law, the ICCPR, the 
European Convention on Human Rights, the Inter-American Convention on Human 
Rights (ACHR), customs, legal precedents and doctrines protect the right.182 
Therefore, the Commission must also draw inspiration from the right in carrying out 
its functions. 
 
(iii) Development and interpretation 
 
There are no finalised cases of the African Court or the Commission that develop and 
interpret the right. The international standard protected by art 17 of the ICCPR, 
art 12 of the UDHR custom, and general principles of law applies in South Africa.183 
South Africa’s modern constitution and statutes expressly protect the right. However, 
even though South Africa is arguably the most stable regional hegemon, the right is 
not protected in Africa as it is in Europe and the Americas because the African Court 
and the Commission must only have regard to and draw inspiration from the right in 
carrying out their functions.  
 




The Bill’s definitions, functions and components have been sourced from South 
African legislation and foreign legislation from Australia, New Zealand, the United 
Kingdom and the United States. The South African legislation comprises the 
National Strategic Intelligence Act, Intelligence Services Oversight Act, Intelligence 
Services Act, Regulation of Interception of Communications and Communications-
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related Information Act and National Strategic Intelligence Amendment Bill.184 The 
comparative foreign legislation is made up of the Intelligence Services Act 
(Australia), the Government Communications Security Bureau Act (New Zealand), 
the Intelligence Services Act and the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act (United 
Kingdom) and the Freedom Act (United States).185 
(b) Summary and analysis 
 
(i) Definitions applied to the National Strategic Intelligence Act 
 
The amendments to s 1 of the National Strategic Intelligence Act are changes to key 
definitions. The definition inserted for ‘signals intelligence’ and ‘foreign signals 
intelligence’ was sourced from the National Strategic Intelligence Amendment Bill 
because it was the only piece of proposed South African intelligence legislation that 
defined such intelligence and offered a broadly workable definition. The definition 
inserted for ‘incidentally obtained intelligence’ was sourced from the Intelligence 
Services Act and the Government Communications Security Bureau Act because 
they were the only pieces of foreign comparative legislation that defined such 
intelligence and captured the kind of intelligence obtained from bulk 
communications that are unintentionally intercepted.  
 
(ii) Functions applied to the National Strategic Intelligence Act 
 
The amendments to s 2 of the National Strategic Intelligence Act are insertions of the 
functions of the NCC. The inserted functions were sourced from the National 
Strategic Intelligence Amendment Bill, the Intelligence Services Act (NZ), the 
Government Communications Security Bureau Act and the Intelligence Services Act 
(UK). Whereas the prohibition of SIGINT clause, the exception to the prohibition 
clause, the functions, the objectives of the functions and the authorisation procedure 
of the NCC are applied from the National Strategic Intelligence Amendment Bill, the 
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limitations to the NCC’s functions are applied from the Intelligence Services Act and 
the communication of incidentally obtained intelligence is applied from the 
Government Communications Security Bureau Act. The authorisation procedure of 
the NCC functions as the sunset clause that ultimately protects the judicial pre-
authorisation of communications interception warrants: 
 
 ‘The agency shall follow the following authorisation procedure: 
 
(a) A designated judge shall regulate and authorise in writing the activities of the 
agency under this section, and in particular authorise each interception target or 
communication which is to be monitored or intercepted, if the designated judge is 
satisfied that such activities are necessary to achieve the objectives set out in 
paragraph (b); 
 
(b) Any official of the agency who monitors or intercepts any communication 
without the authorisation of a designated judge as contemplated in paragraph (a), or 
who acts contrary to such authorisation, shall be guilty of an offence and liable on 
conviction to a fine or to imprisonment for a period not exceeding three years.’186 
 
(iii) Government components applied to RICA 
 
The amendments to s 3 of RICA are insertions of the ‘National Communications 
Centre’ and ‘Office for Interception Centre’ government components. This is 
because these government components, the organs of state that regulate SIGINT in 
South Africa, were not originally included in RICA. This insertion is part of the 
recent absorption of the government components that now make up the SSA. 
 
(iv) Definitions applied to RICA 
 
The amendments to s 1 of RICA are changes to key definitions. The definition 
inserted for ‘account identifier’ was sourced from the Freedom Act (US) and 
expressly provides for means of more strategically targeting bulk communications 
interceptions. The definitions inserted for ‘archived-communication related 
information’ and ‘communication-related information’ were sourced from the 
Freedom Act and expressly provide for email and social media information that can 
and cannot be corresponded or stored. The definition inserted for ‘private 
communication’ was sourced from the Government Communications Security 
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Bureau Act and acts as a safeguard of the right not to have the privacy of one’s 
communications infringed.  
 
(v) Reporting on interception requests, directions and devices 
 
The amendments after s 25 of RICA are insertions of s 26, 38, 42 and 58 about 
judicial and government reporting on interception requests, third-party reporting on 
interception directions and Inspector-General reports on interception devices sourced 
from the National Strategic Intelligence Amendment Bill and the Freedom Act. The 
judicial reporting includes statistics, information disclosure and the dates when the 
report needs to be tabled; the government reporting includes which minister must 
table the report, where the report must be tabled and the necessary disclosure of 
statistics; the third-party reporting notes the service providers that must provide 
statistical financial statements and a liability limitation clause; the Inspector-General 
report provides for the number of reports on the activities of the NCC that need to be 
made to Parliament. Cumulatively, part V (b)(i), (ii), (iii), (iv) and (v) are an 
innovative application of the horizontal accountability mechanism and international 
best practice that can better regulate SIGINT in South Africa. The Bill solves the 
problems of abuse and misuse of foreign intelligence in law by applying foreign 




Part II (c) unpacked the legal issues surrounding the regulation of SIGINT in South 
Africa. With regard to the NCC, judicial pre-authorisation was found to be the most 
important of the protections against the exception that permits communications 
interceptions. However, the NCC interim policy did not refer to RICA and the legal 
duty for judicial pre-authorisation of NCC communications interceptions. Similarly, 
the NCC Bill did not cater for judicial pre-authorisation of NCC SIGINT because 
ministerial approval was considered to be a sufficient alternative to judicial pre-
authorisation by those who wrote the Bill, and RICA’s requirement that intelligence 
officials must obtain judicial pre-authorisation for communications interceptions was 
not sufficiently provided for by the NCC Bill. As for the NIA policy, the NIA and 





they undertook communications interceptions without judicial pre-authorisation. The 
SASS Policy on Interception of Communications summary of RICA did not include 
RICA’s section about the legislative grounds for communications interceptions 
warrant applications by the intelligence services. 
 Part III’s national and regional applications of art 17 of the ICCPR with 
regard to private communications were considered in South Africa and Africa.  
 In South Africa, the legal framework of the right showed that s 2 of RICA, 
which does not permit communications interceptions, and judicial pre-authorisation 
are the most important of the protections against the exception to s 2 with regard to 
the scope and limitations of the right. The development and interpretation of the right 
was seen in the Hyundai and Park-Ross cases, where Ackermann J and Langa J’s 
reasons were applied by the Court when it developed and interpreted the intensity of 
the sphere of the right by emphasising the importance of judicial authorisation for 
infringements of the right.  
 In Africa, the legal framework, scope and limitations of the right showed that 
the African Court must have regard to the right in carrying out its functions and that 
the Commission must also draw inspiration from the right in carrying out its 
functions. With regard to the development and interpretation of the right, I did not 
find finalised cases of the African Court of the Commission that developed and 
interpreted the right, but South Africa’s modern constitution and statutes expressly 
protect the right.  
 Part IV suggested legal reform in South Africa through applying to key South 
African intelligence legislation international legal best practice arising out of 
comparative foreign legislation. The international best practice was drawn from the 
foreign legislation from Australia, New Zealand, the United Kingdom and the United 
States. The key South African intelligence legislation that I recommended amending 
through this application was the National Strategic Intelligence Act, the Intelligence 
Services Act and the Regulation of Interception of Communications and Provision of 
Communication-related Information Act. Foreign legislation arising out of 
international best practice from Australia (Intelligence Services Act), New Zealand 
(Government Communications Security Bureau Act), United Kingdom (Intelligence 
Services Act and Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act) and United States 







Snowden emphasised that ‘the balance of power between the citizenry and the 
government is becoming that of the ruling and the ruled as opposed to the elected and 
the electorate’.187 The relationships between citizens and government, the ruling and 
the ruled and the elected and the electorate helped shape this thesis and underlie the 
importance of the international regulation of foreign intelligence, particularly foreign 
SIGINT liaison. These themes were apparent throughout Chapter I’s review of the 
international regulation of foreign intelligence liaison as a phenomenon, Chapter II’s 
legal analysis of the international regulation of foreign intelligence liaison and 
through the Liberty II and Liberty III judgments and Chapter III’s analysis of the 
international regulation of foreign intelligence liaison through recommendations. 
 Chapter I’s key argument posited that the inevitable abuse and misuse of 
foreign intelligence liaison should be regulated through the horizontal accountability 
mechanism as an international best practice. Chapter II’s core argument claimed that 
communications interception warrants should be regulated by judicial pre-
authorisation. Chapter III applied Chapter I and II’s primary arguments by 
recommending legal reform through an Amendment Bill.  
I conclude my dissertation by applying the sub-arguments that Chapter I 
made for the international regulation of foreign intelligence liaison to Chapter II’s 
and Chapter III’s central arguments. Chapter I defined foreign intelligence and 
argued that foreign intelligence liaison must be regulated by independent judicial 
oversight and accountability in liberal democracies.188 The Ottawa Principles on 
Anti-terrorism and Human Rights suggested that an essential element of a regime for 
international law in liberal democracies such as the UK and US regimes is judicial 
controls.189 There are, however, challenges to effective judicial oversight of foreign 
intelligence liaison as we learnt that independent judicial oversight brings with it the 
problems of sensitive information being shared outside of foreign intelligence 
services – as in Chapter II’s example of sharing foreign intelligence with the 
Commissioner and the IPT in the United Kingdom.190 The Bill’s recommendations 
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for judicial reporting on interception requests are an important application of these 
principles.191 
 Chapter I argued that the horizontal (specifically the restraint of state 
institutions by the judicial branch of government) and third dimension (international 
actors’ role in restraining state institutional actors) are potential accountability 
solutions to the challenges to effective judicial oversight of foreign intelligence 
liaison.192 I also claimed that the problems associated with the trading of information 
and the circumvention of domestic law have drawn attention to the need for more 
effective judicial oversight. Non-compliance with domestic laws has become 
apparent when information is unaccountably traded between intelligence agencies. 
For example, intercepted bulk communications were traded between the UK and US 
foreign intelligence agencies, as evidenced in my summary of the Liberty II and 
Liberty III judgments. Therefore, the Bill’s insertion of government reporting on 
interception requests, third-party reporting on interception directions and Inspector-
General reports on interception devices in Chapter III functions as a pertinent 
example of this horizontal accountability mechanism.193 
 Chapter I focused on the globalisation of foreign intelligence liaison and 
showed that this phenomenon has increased the need for accountability mechanisms 
at national, regional and international levels. These accountability tools were dealt 
with nationally through judicial co-operation, often in the form of rendition, and in 
the case of Chapter II, through foreign SIGINT liaison.194 In Chapter II, I continued 
to defend the proposition that judicial co-operation over intelligence liaison shone 
light on legal accountability mechanisms as a more effective national accountability 
mechanism over intelligence liaison than political equivalents. This was inspired by 
the Liberty II and Liberty III judgments. Therefore, Chapter III’s analysis of the 
national and regional applications of art 17 of the ICCPR with regard to private 
communication become all the more relevant to understanding different levels of 
accountability.195  
 Chapter I asserted that regional inquiries have functioned as a more effective 
tool for oversight, particularly with regard to rendition, than national mechanisms. 
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However, Chapter II challenged this assertion in the context of the regional 
regulation of foreign SIGINT liaison. The challenge offers a prediction about the 
appeal to the 5 December 2014 and 6 February 2015 UK judgments and rulings that 
Liberty has filed to the European Court of Human Rights. This regional appeal is 
expected to be heard sometime during 2015. Partly because of the number of UK 
reservations to the jurisdiction of the ECtHR, I predict that even if the appeal is 
successful for reasons similar to those argued in my critique, it will be the Liberty II 
and Liberty III judgments in the United Kingdom and not the ECtHR regional appeal 
that ultimately leads to significant surveillance law reform in the United Kingdom 
and internationally. The focus on national jurisdictional discretion on matters such as 
national security is a reason for this. A stronger national application of the right in 
South Africa as opposed to the weaker regional application of the right in Africa was 
argued for in Chapter III and my conclusion on this question helps to illustrate why 
national mechanisms for oversight have been more effective than regional 
alternatives.196 
 Chapter I noted that the international regulation of foreign intelligence liaison 
has also been considered by international organisations such as the United Nations. 
The international regulation of foreign SIGINT liaison as confronted by the Liberty 
II and Liberty III judgments in Chapter II strongly suggested the need for a third 
dimension or an international accountability solution to the problem of its effective 
judicial oversight. There is an emerging global administrative legal scholarship that I 
envisage could potentially provide novel solutions to the problems of the 
international judicial regulation of foreign intelligence liaison, but these were not 
within the scope of this dissertation.197 From Chapter III’s summary and analysis of 
international best practice that has arisen out of legislation from Australia, New 
Zealand, the United Kingdom and the United States a case has been argued for a 
third dimension or international accountability solution.198 
 Chapter I identified different forms of foreign intelligence liaison, notably 
bilateral liaison between allies such as the United Kingdom and the United States.199 
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It was argued that formal rather than informal bilateral liaison was the preferred form 
of foreign intelligence co-operation to come under regulation between traditional 
alliances. This commonly included original and synchronised intelligence systems 
such as that under scrutiny between the United Kingdom and United States in the 
Liberty II and Liberty III judgments.200 My Chapter II summary and critique of these 
landmark judgments asserted that the United States is the hub of the global 
telecommunications network. However, beyond intelligence-gathering capabilities, 
the formal bilateral liaison between the United Kingdom and the United States, as 
evidenced in the Liberty II and Liberty III cases, seems reminiscent of a symmetrical 
traditional alliance which requires an independent judiciary in international law to 
regulate against the abuse or misuse of foreign intelligence liaison.201 This inevitable 
abuse or misuse served as the primary reason for my critique of the Liberty II 
judgment. The need for an independent judiciary to regulate against the abuse or 
misuse of foreign intelligence liaison is a reason for Chapter III’s proposed Bill not 
only including a definition of the designated judge to the amendments to the National 
Strategic Intelligence Act but suggesting amendments to RICA by the insertion of a 
clause that provides for judicial reporting on interception requests.202 
 My first Chapter posited that legal systems should frame the operations of 
liaison relationships. It was assumed that even allies such as the United Kingdom and 
the United States would not, in theory, co-operate with requests that breach the 
domestic legitimacy of privacy laws or statutory principles.203 The analysis of the 
Liberty II and Liberty III cases in Chapter II has clearly shown that this theoretical 
assumption does not hold true in practice because the intelligence agencies’ activities 
were ruled to be arbitrary and unlawful for the first time in the 15-year history of the 
IPT’s jurisprudence. Moreover, this theoretical assumption seemed to be even more 
dubious in practice as Chapter III showed that the unregulated NCC SIGINT 
programme in South Africa infringed everyone’s constitutional and legislative right 
not to have the privacy of their communications infringed.204  
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 Chapter I mapped out the cost and benefit of foreign intelligence liaison. We 
saw this in practice through the Liberty II and Liberty III judgments as an example of 
complex symmetrical liaison because a blend of intelligence-gathering assets was 
bartered equitably between the United Kingdom and the United States through 
foreign intelligence platforms.205 The co-operation costs of the foreign intelligence 
liaison between these two states in the Liberty II judgment ought to be calculated 
through the costs associated if the loss of UK–US co-operation did not meet potential 
intelligence and counterintelligence alternatives.206 Chapter II showed that these 
alternatives should have been lawful and not arbitrary, as was held to have been the 
case in the Liberty III judgment. In other words, the law should never be interpreted 
as a cost but should be embraced as a regulatory benefit. Chapter III spoke to the 
regulatory benefit of the law rather than the cost and benefit of foreign intelligence 
liaison through the rulings in the Bernstein v Bester, Hyundai, Park-Ross and 
Glenister cases and the legal reform recommended in the Bill.207  
 I argued in Chapter I that mistrust between, for example, the United Kingdom 
and the United States, can be overcome through decentralised foreign intelligence 
liaison and via best-practice methods that develop trust between foreign intelligence 
agencies overtime.208 While decentralised international and independent judicial 
regulation of foreign intelligence liaison may realise fewer overall gains in foreign 
intelligence sharing than an institutionally centralised alternative, decentralised 
foreign intelligence liaison would probably be a more realistic and humble 
development in the regulation of foreign intelligence sharing.209 The foundational 
building block of any international best-practice methodology ought to be an 
independent international judiciary that helps to regulate practice. Chapter II, 
therefore, asserted that international judicial regulation of foreign intelligence liaison 
will lead, in the long term, to international best-practice methodologies of the kind 
inspired by the legal reform being pressured to arise out of the Liberty II and 
Liberty III judgments. Furthermore, Chapter III’s application of the argument for 
judicial pre-authorisation of communications interception warrants to the Bill 
through the functions of the NCC authorisation procedure is a useful example of how 
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international best-practice methods can develop trust and regulate foreign 
intelligence liaison in the long run. The case study achieved this through the best-
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To amend the National Strategic Intelligence Act, 1994, so as to insert new 
definitions; and to provide for the functions of the agency; and to provide for 
matters connected therewith. To amend the Intelligence Services Act, 2002, so 
as to provide for the government components that absorb into and make up the 
State Security Agency. To amend the Regulation of Interception of 
Communications and Provision of Communication-Related Information Act, 




BE IT ENACTED by the Parliament of the Republic of South Africa, as follows:– 
 
Amendment of section 1 of Act 39 of 1994, as amended by section 1 of Act 37 of 
1998, section 1 of Act 66 of 2000, section 1 of Act 67 of 2002, section 1 of Act 52 
of 2003 and section 1 of Act 11 of 2013 
 
 1. Section 1 of the National Strategic Intelligence Act, 1994 (hereinafter 
referred to as the principal Act),  
 is hereby amended- 
(a) by the insertion after the definition of “Cabinet” of the following definition: 
“communication” means communication as defined in the Regulation of 
Interception of Communications and Provision of Communication-related 
Information Act No. 70 of 2002;”210; 
(b) by the insertion after the definition of “departmental intelligence” of the 
following definition: 
“ ‘designated judge’ means designated judge as defined in the in the Regulation of 
Interception of Communications and Provision of Communication-related 
Information Act No. 70 of 2002;”211; 
(c) by the insertion after the definition of “foreign military intelligence” of the 
following definition: 
“ ‘foreign signals intelligence’ means intelligence derived from the interception of 
electromagnetic, acoustic, and other signals, including the equipment and encrypted 
material that produces such signals, and includes any communication that eminates 
from a foreign person or a foreign organisation outside the borders of the Republic, 
or passes through or ends in the Republic;”212; 
 
(d) by the insertion after the definition of “foreign signals intelligence” of the 
following definition: 
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“ (a) ‘incidentally obtained intelligence’ means intelligence that is obtained in the 
course of gathering intelligence about the capabilities, intentions, or activities of 
foreign persons or foreign organisations; but 
(b) that is not intelligence of the kind referred to in paragraph (a);”213; 
(e) by the insertion after the definition of “interception direction” of the 
following definition: 
“ ‘interception target’ means interception target as defined in the notice in terms of 
section 31 of the Regulation of Interception of Communications and Provision of 
Communication-related information Act No. 70 of 2002;”214; 
(f) by the insertion after the definition of “Minister” of the following definition: 
“ ‘monitor’ means monitor as defined in the Regulation of Interception of 
Communications and Provision of Communication-related Information Act No. 70 of 
2002;”215; 
(g) by the insertion after the definition of “National Prosecuting Authority Act” 
of the following definition: 
“ ‘national security’ means national security as defined in the General Intelligence 
Laws Amendment Act No. 11 of 2013;”216; 
(h) by the insertion after the definition of “national security” of the following 
definition: 
“ ‘signals intelligence’ means intelligence derived from the interception of 
electromagnetic, acoustic, and other signals, including the equipment and encrypted 
material that produces such signals, and includes any communication that eminates 
from inside the borders of the Republic;”217; 
 
Amendment of section 2 of Act 39 of 1994, as amended by section 2 of Act 37 of 
1998, section 2 of Act 67 of 2002 and section 2 of Act 11 of 2013 
 
2. Section 2 of the principal Act is hereby amended by the insertion after subsection 
(2A) of the following subsection: 
 “ (2B) The agency is prohibited from collecting signals intelligence unless: 
 
(i)       for the collection of foreign signals intelligence as stated in the functions 
of 2C(a)(i); 
(ii)       for the performance of the SSA’s functions as stated in 2C(a); 
(iii)      the collection is authorised by the designated judge as stated in 2D; 
 
but does not include: 
 
(i)        any activities for the purpose of furthering the interests of a South African 
political 
        party or other South African political organisation; 
(ii)       any activities that the agency does not perform with due regard for the 
functions  
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            contemplated in paragraph 2C(a), the rights set out in Chapter 2 of the 
Constitution  
            and subject to paragraph 2C(d); 
 
(2C) (a) The functions of the agency shall, subject to section 3, be: 
(i) to collect foreign signals intelligence about the capabilities, intentions or 
activities of foreign persons or foreign organisations outside of the Republic; 
(ii) to control and advise on the provision and application of cryptographic 
solutions, communication and computer technologies and other specialised 
technologies acquired in connection with the performance of its other functions in 
the Republic, in consultation with the relevant stakeholders; 
(iii) to promote the co-ordination and optimal usage of all national signals 
intelligence resources and platforms in the Republic; and  
(iv) to undertake and co-ordinate research, design and development of all 
cryptographic solutions and information communications technology security 
systems and products for all organs of state, in consultation with the relevant 
stakeholders; 
(b)  The agency may contemplate the functions contemplated in paragraph (a) only 
for the following objectives: 
(i)  the function as stated in 2C(a)(i); 
(ii)  To identify any threat or potential threat to the national security of the Republic 
or its   people; 
(c)  to intercept communication as a method of last resort that can only take place if 
non-intrusive methods are inadequate or inappropriate;       
(d) The agency is prohibited from intercepting any communications that do not fall 
within the definition of “foreign signals intelligence”; 
(e)  The function of the agency to co-operate with other entities to facilitate their 
functions is to co-operate with, and to provide advice and assistance to, the following 
for the purpose of facilitating the performance of their functions: 
 (i)  Electronic Communications Security (Pty) Ltd; 
 (ii)  the South African National Academy of Intelligence; 
 (iii)  the National Intelligence Agency; 
 (iv)  the South African Secret Service; 
 (v)  the National Communications Centre; and 
 (vi) the Office for Interception Centre. 
(f)  To avoid doubt, the agency may perform its function under paragraph (e)- 
(i)  only to the extent that the advice and assistance are provided for the purpose of 
activities that the entities may lawfully undertake; and  
(ii)  subject to and in accordance with any limitations, restrictions, and protections 
under which those entities perform their functions and exercise their powers; and 
(iii)  even though the advice and assistance might involve the exercise of powers by, 
or the sharing of the capabilities of, the agency that the agency is not, or could not 
be, authorised to exercise or share in the performance of its other functions. 
(g)  Any advice or assistance provided by the agency under paragraph (e) to another 
entity is subject to- 
(i)  the jurisdiction of any other body or authority to the same extent as the other 





(ii)  the oversight of the Inspector-General of Intelligence under his or her functions 
in section 7 of the Intelligence Services Oversight Act No. 40 of 1994;”218; 
 
2D  The agency may communicate incidentally obtain intelligence only if: 
(ii)  to communicate incidentally obtained intelligence to appropriate State 
authorities or to authorities of other countries approved by a designated judge as 
being capable of assisting the agency in the performance of its functions if the 
intelligence relates to the involvement, or likely involvement, by a person in one or 
more of the following activities: 
 (ii.i)  activities that present a significant risk to a person’s safety; 
 (ii.ii)  acting for, or on behalf of, a foreign power; 
 (ii.iii)  activities that are a threat to national security; and 
 (ii.iv)  committing a serious crime; and 
 
 
2E The agency shall follow the following authorisation procedure: 
(a)  A designated judge shall regulate and authorise in writing the activities of the 
agency under this section, and in particular authorise each interception target or 
communication which is to be monitored or intercepted, if the designated judge is 
satisfied that such activities are necessary to achieve the objectives set out in 
paragraph (b); 
(b)  Any official of the agency who monitors or intercepts any communication 
without the authorisation of a designated judge as contemplated in paragraph (a), or 
who acts contrary to such authorisation, shall be guilty of an offence and liable on 
conviction to a fine or to imprisonment for a period not exceeding three years;”219; 
 
Amendment of section 3 of Act 65 of 2002, as amended by section 3 of Act 11 of 
2013 
 
 1. Section 3 of the Intelligence Services Act, 2002 (hereinafter referred to as 
the principal Act),  
 is hereby amended by the insertion after subsection 3(1) of the following 
subsection: 
“3(1A)  The following government components listed in Part A of Schedule 3 to the 
Public Service Act, 1994 (Proclamation No. 103 of 1994), as that Part read 
immediately prior to the commencement of the General Intelligence Laws 
Amendment Act, 2013, are hereby absorbed into and make up the State Security 
Agency: 
(a) Electronic Communications Security (Pty) Ltd; 
(b)      the South African National Academy of Intelligence; 
(c)      the National Intelligence Agency; 
(d)      the South African Secret Service; 
(e)      the National Communications Centre; and 
(f)      the Office for Interception Centre. 
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Amendment of section 1 of Act 70 of 2002, as amended by section 1 of Act 36 of 
2005, section 1 of Act 48 of 2008, section 1 of Act 1 of 2011 and section 1 of Act 
11 of 2013 
 
1. Section 1 of the Regulation of Interception of Communications and Provision of 
Communication-related Information Act, 2002 (hereinafter referred to as the 
principal Act),  
 is hereby amended- 
(a)  by the insertion after “definitions and interpretation” of the following definition: 
 “ ‘account identifier’ means a telephone or instrument number, other 
subscriber number,  
 email address, or username used to uniquely identify an account;”220; 
(b)  by the insertion after the definition of “archived communication-related 
direction” of the following definition: 
 “ ‘archived-communication related information’ means any 
communication-related information in the possession of a telecommunication, email 
or social media service provider and which is being stored by that 
telecommunication, email or social media service provider in terms of section 
30(1)(b) for the period determined in a directive referred to in section 30(2)(a), 
beginning on the first day immediately following the expiration of a period of 90 
days after the date of the transmission of the indirect communication to which that 
communication-related information relates;  
(c) by the insertion after the definition of “communication” of the following 
definition: 
“ ‘communication-related information’ means- 
(1) any information relating to an indirect communication which is available in 
the records of a telecommunication, email or social media service provider, and 
includes switching, dialing, signaling information and the “to” and “from” lines in an 
email that identifies the origin, destination, termination, duration, and equipment 
used in respect, of each indirect communication generated or received by a customer 
or user of any equipment, facility or service provided by such a telecommunication, 
email or social media service provider; 
(2) does not include- 
(a) the substantive content of any communication as defined in the Regulation of 
Interception of Communications and Provision of Communication-related 
Information Act No. 70 of 2002; 
(b) the name, address or financial information of a subscriber or customer; or 
(c) cell site location information;”221; 
(d)  by the insertion after the definition of “informal settlement” of the following 
definition: 
 “ ‘information’ means information as defined in the Protection of 
Information Bill No. 28  
 of 2008;”222;                                     
(e)  by the insertion after the definition of “private body” of the following definition: 
 “ ‘private communication’- 
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(a) means a communication between two or more parties made under 
circumstances that may reasonably be taken to indicate that any party to the 
communication desires it to be confined to the parties to the communication but;  
(b) does not include a communication occurring in circumstances in which any 
party ought reasonably to expect that the communication may be intercepted by some 
other person not having the express or implied consent of any party to do so;”223;  
 
Insertion after section 25 of Act 70 of 2002 
 
1. Section 26 is hereby inserted into the principal Act: 
 
 “26. Judicial Reporting on Interception Requests  
 
[In general,] a report regarding the functions performed by the designated judge in 
terms of the Regulation of Interception of Communications and Provision of 
Communication-related Information Act No. 70 of 2002, including statistics 
regarding such functions, together with any comments or recommendations which 
the designated judge may deem appropriate, must 
 
(a) disclose any information contained in an application or direction referred to 
in the Regulation of Interception of Communications and Provision of 
Communication-related Information Act No. 70 of 2002; and 
(b)  be tabled annually in September in the National Assembly”224; 
 
Insertion after section 37 of Act 70 of 2002 
 
2. Section 38 is hereby replaced by the insertion of the following reporting 
provisions: 
 
 “38. Government Reporting on Interception Requests.- 
 
“The Minister of State Security must table an annual report to the National Assembly 
disclosing statistics regarding any application(s) made under Chapter 3 of the 
Regulation of Interception of Communications and Provision of Communication-
related Information Act No. 70 of 2002;” 
 
Insertion after section 41 of Act 70 of 2002 
 
3. Section 42 is hereby inserted into the principal Act: 
 
 “42. Third-party Reporting on Interception Directions.- 
 
(1) (a) Any decryption key holder, telecommunication, postal, email and social 
media service provider must disclose in its annual financial statements statistical 
information as any applications received and direction complied with in terms of 
Chapter 3 and section 25 of the Regulation of Interception of Communications and 
Communication-related Information Act No. 70 of 2002; 
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 (2) Limitation on liability – any holder or service provider contemplated in 
subsection (1), who discloses information contemplated in that subsection and whom 
reasonably believes, in good faith, that such disclosure is authorised by this section, 
is not criminally or civilly liable in any court for such disclosure;”225; 
 
    
Insertion after section 57 of Act 70 of 2002 
 
5. Section 57 of the principal Act is hereby replaced by the insertion after Chapter 10 
of the following reporting provisions: 
 
“58. Inspector General Reports on Interception Devices.-  
 
The Inspector-General of Intelligence contemplated in section 7 of the Intelligence 
Services Oversight Act No. 40 of 1994, shall report annually to Parliament on the 
activities of the NCC, and in such report indicate any contraventions by the NCC of 
the provisions of the Regulation of Interception of Communications and Provision of 
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